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Social Risks, Welfare Rights and the Paradigm of Proceduralisation
The combining of the institutions of the liberal constitutional state 
and the social state
1. The legal philosophy and constitutional theory discussion about welfare 
rights
The most recent philosophical and constitutional theory discussions about 
welfare rights have been dominated, on the one hand, by an antithetical fixation 
on the mere "formal" negative right to liberty1 and, on the other hand, by an 
ethic which subjects the evaluation of social conditions and processes to a 
materialising standard of correctness or which seeks to outdo the universality of 
rules through the universalizability of the foundation of rules2. A discourse
!Cf. for the moral foundation o f welfare rights R.E. Goodin, Stabilizing Expections: The 
Role of Eamings-Related Benefits in Social Welfare Policy, Ethics 1990, 530; M. Freeden, 
Human Rights and Welfare: A  Communitarian View, Ethics, 1990, 489; E. Mack,
Libertarianism Untamed, J. o f Social Phil. 1991, 64; D. Copp, The Right to an Adequate 
Standard of Living: Justice, Autonomy and Basic Needs, Soc. Phil, and Pol. 1992, 231; the 
conceptions are based on a supposed priority o f public argumentation, cf. especially J. Rawls, 
A  Theory of Justice, Cambridge/Mass., 1971 and more differentiated id., Political Liberalism, 
New York 1993. For a critique of the theoretical foundations of the basic conception of 
"public" justice cf. J. Harsanyi, Quality, Responsibility and Justice as seen from the Utilitarian 
Perspective, Theory and Decision 1991, 141; for a philosophical critique cf. B.W. Brower, 
The Limits of Public Reason, J. o f Phil. 1994, 5; for political conceptions of "social rights" 
cf. U.K. PreuB, Verfassungstheoretische Uberlegungen zur normativen Begriindung des 
Wohlfahrtstaates, in: Ch. Sachsse et al. (eds.), Sicherheit und Freiheit, Frankfurt/M. 1990, p. 
125; J. Habermas, Faktizitat und Geltung, Frankfurt/M. 1992, p. 503 ss.; I.M. Young, Justice 
and the Politics o f Difference, Princeton 1990, p. 25; P. Flora (ed.), Growth to Limits: The 
Western European Welfare States since World War n , 2 vols., Berlin/New York 1986; A. 
Sen, Rights and Agency, Phil, and Public Affairs 1981, 3; id., Inequality Re-examined, 
Oxford 1992, esp. p. 109, 151; cf. also the overview of D.E. Ashford, Bringing the Welfare 
State Back, in: Comparative Politics 1991, 351.
2Cf. only D. P. Currie, Positive and negative Constitutional Rights, Chicago L.R. 1986, 
964; for a neo-institutionalist position cf. P.H. Aronson, Procedural and Substantive 
Constitutional Protection of Economic Liberties, Cato Journal 1987, 345; for a doctrinal 
conception o f "protective duties" of the state cf. generally F.O. Kopp, Grundrechtliche Schutz- 



























































































- ethical version self-referentially amounts to conceding from the beginning a 
higher position to a certain argumentation corresponding to certain test 
procedures. In Habermas, this is derived from the universalizability of language, 
which is calculated for self-enlightenment3. The politically employed variant of 
this construction gives priority to the public constitution of civil society in the 
medium of explicit agreement about rules above the priority it gives to the 
institutions of private society, to personality-formation, the allocation of 
responsibility and family, work, enterprises etc4. From the constitutional theory 
point of view, this understanding has been carried by some proponents of 
discourse ethics to the point that it would result in a claim to an equal stake in 
the goods acquired in society emerging from the same right to participation in 
the institutions of self-understanding in the medium of publicity5. The 
traditional, liberal theory of basic law could only ever ease provisionally the re­
lationship of conflict between public and private rights by means of historical 
institutions and the conventions generated thereby; on the other hand, from 
operating with incompatibilities, it again and again received new stimuli to 
remodelling, for instance, the supplementing of individual rights to freedom with 
group autonomy, or of individual rights to equality with group parity6. It 
hardly seems plausible that these historical forms of the co-ordination of the
3Cf. J. Habermas, Théorie des kommunikativen Handelns, vol. 1, Frankfurt/M. 1981, p. 
28, 339; id., Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, Frankfurt/M. 1985, p. 376; for a 
"post-modem" critique cf. N. Bolz, Am Ende der Gutenberg-Galaxis, München 1993, p. 66 
ss.
4For a theoretical differentiation o f the relationship between "public" and "private" cf. J.F. 
Spitz, La face cachée de la philosophie politique moderne, Critique 1993, 307 ss.; G. Klosko, 
"Political" Philosophy and American Culture, APSR 1993, 348, 355.
5Cf. U. Rôdel/H. Dubiel/G. Frankenberg, Die demokratische Frage, Frankfurt/M. 1989, 
p. 187 ss.





























































































public and the private could be removed by the priority of one side, of a public 
sphere increased in a procedural variant of communicative-argumentative 
rationality. The arguments employed for this may be reduced to the ever- 
repeated, but never elaborated, recourse to the universalising compulsions 
attributed to language. Moreover, the conception seeks to gain in credibility 
rather through a negative de-limiting of a conception of freedom which is 
allegedly merely formal and which isolates the individual from its social 
context7; this argument is, however, not further refined except by reference to 
the - scarcely derivable but for the purposes of argument not exactly produc­
tive - embedding of the individual in a network of relationships, purposes, aims, 
moral concepts etc.
In the end, this is also the common reference point of those conceptions 
which derive welfare rights in different variants of a "materialising" of rights 
to the necessity of the satisfaction of needs8 from the positive guaranteeing of 
potentials for action9 (rather than mere possibilities for action) or from civil 
status10, which is to enable a direct right to participation in social welfare. 
Thus, in these variants, civil rights are not primarily determined by the share in 
public discussion11. At this point, details of the theoretical grounds for welfare 
rights in the various versions of a “materialising or of a discourse-ethically
7Cf. for a critique St. Holmes, The Anatomy of Anti-Liberalism, Cambridge/London 1993.
sCf. for doctrinal constructions H.F. Zacher, Verrechtlichung im Bereich des Sozialen, in: 
F. Kübler (ed.), Verrechtlichung von Wirtschaft, Arbeit und sozialer Solidaritat, Frankfurt/M. 
1984, p. 14; cf. for a theoretical differentiation Aronson, ibid.; H.A. Simon, Rationality as 
Process and as Product o f Thought, Am.Ec.Rev. 1978, 1; id., Organizations and Markets, J. 
of Ec. Perspectives 1991, 25.
9Cf. Sen, ibid.
10Cf. Rôdel et. al., ibid., p. 187 ss.; Preufi, ibid.
“ There is no clear separation between the different conceptions, for a combination of 




























































































understood "proceduralisation" of basic rights shall not be dealt with. Rather, it 
will be demonstrated that a one-sided understanding of the formal, liberal theory 
of fundamental rights is at the basis of both conceptions and this understanding 
misses the pre-suppositions of the liberal concept of freedom, especially its 
support through other social institutions and, above all, its cognitive orientation- 
achievement. It is precisely this latter which may have exhausted itself 
completely or partially, but the search for functional equivalents which are 
focused on the mastering of higher complexity can only succeed if the paradigm 
of classical liberal law (and its limitations) is more exactly reconstructed. This 
is the more valid as it is precisely the lack of practical orientation of the newer 
variants of a materialisation of civil rights and that discourse-ethical procedurali­
sation, which is conspicuous and the problem of the co-ordination with existing 
arguments from the individual, differentiated sub-systems through the claim for 
their subordination is made difficult, if not even impossible. "The practice- 
related coercion of the individual through society is, in any case, not the object 
of discourse ethics which has, rather, its eye on a kind of self-obligation in 
commerce with other members of society12." The theories outlined claim a 
priority for an ethical-moral argumentation whose basis exhausts itself in a 
circular self-affirmation of moral forms of argumentation which refers all 
practical arguments normatively to the examination through the procedure of 
argumentative self-enlightenment of language-mediated inter-subjectivity.
It is precisely this last claim of the most recent discourse ethics which - as 
will be shown later - fulfils, paradoxically enough, an eminently practical 
function: it demonstrates the claim to restoration of a substantive rule-based 
subjectivity in a procedural unity of inter-subjective mediation.
An ethic which is self-establishing through the formal procedure of
12For a general critique of the separation of genesis and validity in moral theory cf. H. 




























































































argumenting and which, thereby, simultaneously postulates the centrality of the 
political-public institutions of deliberation, or a materialising moral guaranteeing 
the "result justice"13 of the exercise of freedom obstruct, however, through their 
monism access to the changed conditions of social co-operation under 
conditions of complexity.
It will be shown that ethical and moral argumentation can, at best, take 
over a limited critical function, if at all, and that, conversely, its popularity more 
readily corresponds to the rise of a class of weakly professionalised "discourse 
workers" (teachers, journalists, social workers, social education workers etc.)14 
whose intellectual demands are in inverse proportion to their potential for action. 
Those obligations which can no longer be attributed to or solved by old patterns 
and which accompany the increased self-modification capability of society, they 
assign to a meta level (that of morality and ethics) which is not at all suitable 
for this purpose. This, for its part, finds its adequate expressions in a diffuse 
"culture of complaint"15: in times of a self-weakening rule-universalism, 
decisions about the attribution of actions and consequences can, apparently, be 
"democratically" made on the basis of self-examining discourses.
Already these few remarks have shown that a theory of the foundation of 
welfare rights can have wide practical consequences because it - just like the 
classical, liberal rights of personal liberty - produces certain, paradigmatic order-
13Cf. A. Wildavsky, The Three Cultures: Explaining Anomalies in the American Welfare 
State, The Public Interest 1982, 45.
14Cf. J.L. Golden, Rhétorique et production du savoir: Les grands courants de la théorie 
rhétorique américaine, in: A. Lempereur (ed.), L’argumentation, Colloque de Cerisy, Liège 
1991, p. 53.
15Cf. generally, R. Hughes, Culture of Complaint, New York 1993; P. Bruckner, La 




























































































achievements which enable expectation-formation16 and which have to be 
attuned to the different "levels" of the law17. It will be seen that it is precisely 
discourse ethics and the highly abstract discourse of materialising which not 
only do not take into consideration the cognitive functions of the law but which 
actively block them. In the following, therefore, the question will first be 
considered which orientation-achievement the classical, liberal model of freedom 
has produced. The answer to this question is a pre-requisite for the further 
question on the limits of the liberal legal paradigm and the pre-requisites and 
consequences of the appearance of new (social) legal forms and the conditions 
of the possibility of the co-ordination of the cognitive achievements of the old 
and the new paradigms.
2. The construction of liberal rights of liberty
It is a long-fostered but, nonetheless, unfounded idea that liberal rights to 
liberty are nothing other than rights of defence in relation to the state and, 
therefore, require supplementation through "material", substantial rights to 
participation in collective co-existence and its real bases (basic income etc.)18. 
(Conversely, the opposite of the theory here represented has not, however, yet 
ensued, namely, that the liberal legal paradigm is in no need of any change; it 
depends here much more on the historically and socially appropriate 
classification of the problems of the evolution of law.) The establishing of the
16Cf. generally N. Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M. 1993, p. 310 ss.; 
R.A. Heiner, The Origins of Predictible Behavior, Am.Ec.Rev. 1983, 560; id., Imperfect 
Decisions and the Law: On the Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules, J. o f Legal Studies 
1986, 227.
17Cf. J.S. Coleman, The Role of Rights in the Theory of Social Action, JI TE 1993, 213,





























































































liberal right to liberty on a formal "negative" defence against intrusion did have 
historical and political functions which, correspondingly, also permitted the 
emergence of differing legal traditions in the various European countries. The 
individualism of liberal law aimed, above all, at the neutralising of certain 
handed down ideologies and demands of older, collective institutions (churches, 
trade organisations, the nobility etc.)19. The exclusively negative fixation on the 
traditional stock of norms and conventionalised relationships must not be 
separated from its context and hypostatised from its a-historical supposition as 
though the idea were typical of liberal law that society consists of monads 
which, free of context, under a law equal for all enter into and than dissolve 
selective (contractual) relationships20. This would be to misunderstand the mere 
"indirect" character of liberal law, whose self-evident background is based on 
the idea that it is precisely the merely normative (not socio-ontological) idea 
of free and equal subjects which sets in motion the formation of a network of 
lasting, longer-term co-operation which enables expectation-formation and, 
thereby, creates trust as the basis for the testing of new possibilities21. The 
legitimation for property does not lie primarily in the reward of individual 
competence but precisely in the fact that it likewise benefits the non-owner if 
a break in traditional relationships ensues through the institutionalising of 
property22. Even if this emphasis has not been reflected in legal history, it is, 
nevertheless, possible to see retrospectively the legitimation of rights to personal
19Cf. Holmes, ibid.
“ Cf. also F. Dubet, The System, the Actor and the Social Subject, Thesis Eleven no. 38 
(1994), 16.
21For the paradoxical relationship between trust and civil liberties cf. A.B. Seligman, Trust 
and the Meaning of Civil Society, Int. J. of Politics, Culture and Society 1992, 5.
“ Cf. D. Schmidtz, When is Original Appropriation Required?, The Monist 1990, 504; 




























































































liberty precisely in that everyone, thereby, has been given the possibility of 
using in his or her decisions that network of artificial (not tradition-bound) 
relationships - built through repeated co-operation - and the knowledge dispersed 
over it23.
The general law should not be seen merely as a mutual fetter on 
individual egoism but, much rather, the constraint of law has to be considered 
in a narrow, positive context with the right to individual liberty: to the extent 
that each abides by the law, each thus offers the others the possibility of 
multifarious activities and, in particular, the possibility of discovering new 
possibilities. In this lie the roots of the interest in creating institutions which are 
independent of the immediate motives of those involved and which, for their 
part, secure the complex relationship-networks between individuals and the 
development of conventions. It is precisely the development of such institutions 
not dependent on the motives of those involved which is one of the cultural 
achievements of western civilisation, to which classical, liberal law has also 
contributed greatly: positive law has only superficially the function of setting a 
"limit" to the monad "individual", its primary task is to stabilise expectations24 
and to facilitate "positively" longer-term co-operation which, in individual cases, 
can be largely detached from the motives.
The reverse side of this impersonal institutionalising of relationships of 
co-operation through individual laws is mistrust towards the “immediate” public 
interest which prevails against private interests25. With the freedom of the
BVgl. allgemein F A . v. Hayek, Recht, Gesetzgebung und Freiheit, vol. 1, Second edition,
Landsberg 1986.
MCf. Luhmann, ibid., p. 310 ff. For the necessity o f decisions and rules under conditions 
of uncertainty cf. Heiner, ibid.




























































































individual and her or his constraint by the law26, comes the idea that trust must 
be generalised and cannot be dependent only on traditional, personal 
relationships27. On this is based the readiness to adopt in strategies for action 
those constraints which come with the network of a (in particular, economic) 
practice and not to burden these with direct "personal" considerations regarding 
purpose and value. Co-ordination takes place in advance because the acceptance 
of constraints - put in place by "practice" - makes possible trust in generalised, 
person-independent form.
One may criticise these achievements here briefly outlined, but criticism 
which ignores the cognitive, knowledge-producing components of liberal law 
and confuses normative scepticism in relation to centrally given aims with 
ignorance of the contextual dependency of the collective effects of the rights to 
personal liberty is not very convincing. Only through a historically informed 
reflection on the achievements and limitations of the liberal model of law, is a 
description of the new demands possible, to which the classical paradigm28 can 
no longer be attuned without problem and which, therefore, demand new 
evolutionary steps. On the other hand, a mere “materialising”29, the installation 
of laws of compensation to correct undesired "results" or even a discourse- 
ethical proceduralisation which outdoes the universality of rules through a super­
moral30, has to take into account an orientation-deficit because it ignores the
“ For a theoretical construction cf. R.C. Christensen, Was heifit Gesetzesbindung?, Berlin 
1989.
" C t Seligman, ibid. (Civil society...).
“ Cf. Spitz, ibid.
29For a doctrinal construction of the relationship between social rights and liberties cf. 
Zacher, ibid.
“ For an approach adapting discourse theory to conditions of uncertainty cf. H. Dubiel, 




























































































scepticism of classical liberalism with regard to good intentions and good 
reasons.
Classical liberalism - as has been shown - has in no respect had an asocial 
character; it has not neglected the problem of justice, to which its critics always 
point, but has considered its solution impossible or, at least, difficult31. The 
answer to the classical liberal paradigm can then, however, not consist in self­
enlightenment and the enlightenment of others about just this problem, but only 
in the naming of the means with which it is to be solved32. A more precise 
analysis of the liberal conception of democracy would belong to this which 
- even if in historically and nationally differing variants - has pre-supposed the 
deliberation on a rational, that is, also lasting, order separate from the individual 
persons and individual decisions. This political component of democracy has its 
necessary counterpart in a relatively lasting allocation of individual 
responsibility, which must be kept separate from the public and the general 
interest33. This also finds expression in that within constitutional law a 
distinction must be made between the centre and the periphery34: in particular, 
if one does not differentiate between freedom and equality from this standpoint, 
thus, considers, for instance, equality as having the same importance as freedom, 
one creates a relationship of tension that can only be overcome through a 
strengthening of the state which, there again, impedes the development of secu­
rity of expectation within the social forms of practice and relationship networks. 
Nor is this, of course, a possibility which is to be rejected out of hand but
31Cf. generally G. Schmidtz, The Limits o f Government, Boulder/San Francisco 1991.
32Cf. Wildavsky, ibid.
33The interpenetration of "public" and "private" tends to undermine conditions of





























































































criticism must, however, confront itself with the possible consequences of an 
over-burdening of the medium of publicity; not everything can be referred to the 
possibility of agreement and the limits of its complexity be ignored. Conversely, 
a perspective on the cognitive order-achievements of the liberal, democratic 
model of law offers the advantage of enabling also an estimate of changes to 
which the evolution of civil society, as also that of the state, has been exposed 
and which have transformed the conditions of their self-description. It turns out 
that the generating of a new knowledge basis and new types of science, such as 
statistics, has been made possible precisely through the development of social, 
inter-organisational networks of relationships, supported and stabilised through 
the rise of organisations35: therewith, the conditions have been created for 
responsibility to be attributed no longer only, according to general laws, to 
private, individual action, but to be described as collective risks and, 
accordingly, attributed collectively36. Above all, with the appearance of large 
organisations, the self-modification of society has been expedited, the 
complexity and the wealth of alternatives in (organisational) action have 
increased and, simultaneously stable attributions of responsibility to the 
individual have weakened37.
This development has led not only to the construction of public insurance 
but also to the recognition of the possibility of a collective disposal over work 
in the form of collective agreements, and to long-term corporate arrangements
35Cf. generally C. Ménard, Les organisations en économie de marché, Rev. d’Econ. Poi. 
1989, 771; K.-H. Ladeur, Das Umweltrecht der Wissensgesellschaft, Berlin 1995.
36For the political use o f the concept o f "probability" cf. F. Ewald, L’Etat - providence, 
Paris 1986; I. Hacking, The Taming of Chance, Cambridge 1990.





























































































and other new collective strategies for action38. The details of this development 
need not concern us here. In the perspective adopted here on the cognitive 
function of liberal law it must, however, be noticed that with the disruption of 
the stable separation of general law (general regularity) and the action of 
individuals - a separation which has always presupposed within a certain range 
of fluctuation a balance around a quiet self-stabilising point of order-formation - 
there also goes a change in the self-description of the political institutions of 
liberalism, in particular, a crisis of representation and of the general law39. The 
roots of this lie particularly in the fact that groups - parties, trades unions, 
associations, large concerns - take over an independent, cognitive, knowledge­
generating function and, for their part, pluralise the institutionalisation of social 
knowledge40.
38For the crisis o f collective bargaining systems in labour law cf. P. Rosanvallon, La 
nouvelle crise de l ’Etat-Providence, Cahiers de la Fondation Saint-Simon 1993 (September), 
1; for the possible evolution of more flexible forms of poly-corporatism cf. G. Teubner, The 
"State" o f Private Networks: The Emerging Legal Regime of Poly-Corporatism in Germany, 
Brigham Young University Law Rev. 1993, 553.
39Cf. D. Grimm, Die Zukunft der Verfassung, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 
1989, 5; K.-H. Ladeur, Postmoderne Verfassungstheorie, in: U.K. PreuB (ed.), Der Begriff 
der Verfassung, Frankfurt/M. 1994 p. 304 ss.
“ Cf. O. Favereau, Valeur d’option et flexibilité. De la rationalité substantielle à la 
rationalité procédurale, in: P. Cohendet/P. Llerena (eds.), Flexibilité, information et décision, 





























































































3. From individual action-attribution to collective risk-attribution
a) The change of social reality and its portrayal in the society of 
organisations
The contrary developments of, on the one hand, the accelerated self­
transformation of society, which disrupts the stable regularity and the 
maintenance of the formation of equilibrium and, on the other hand, a generating 
of a new stock of knowledge which are at the disposal of longer-term operating 
organisations which strategically change relationship-networks41, has resulted 
in the individual attribution of success or failure in action coming into 
competition with a description as collective risk. For the connection discussed 
here, it is important to emphasise that this development is not primarily indebted 
to a different evaluation of formal, individual freedom but that the relationship 
of general knowledge, regularity and lawfulness42, on the one hand, and 
individual attribution, on the other hand, is superseded by the appearance of 
organisations and the accompanying new formation of patterns of knowledge- 
production and, thereby, social self-description becomes considerably more 
complex. These new kinds of knowledge and stocks of knowledge are 
characterised primarily by no longer being continually produced through spon­
taneous variations of a general knowledge distributed through the entire network 
of relationships and able to be systematised in general regularities, but their 
frames of reference, their scope of possibility, change strategically and, 
therewith, metaphorically expressed, order will only be possible far from 
equilibrium.
This development first found expression within the state itself, especially






























































































in the setting up of groups and organisations but also in the transition to the 
social state43. Groups and organisations produce their own interpretations of 
reality and create thereby connexion-compulsions for their own action and that 
of other persons and groups44. They thus become a part of the social "memory" 
through which knowledge is produced, stored and distributed. These new, plural, 
(inter-)organisational constmctions of possibility45, combine, in a way which 
is hard to describe, with the old stock of knowledge which is dispersed through 
the social network of relationships. The modem group and social state has 
produced a new organisation-culture and led to the emergence of new stocks of 
knowledge which are orientated on the standardising-achievements of big 
business and are probabilistic and stochastic, as well as to new collective 
attributions46: coincidences and dangers which were formerly individually 
attributed are now construed as collective risks47; the formation of expectation 
in the economy - rule-dependent but subject to individual fluctuations - is more 
and more changed over to global (inter-)organisational, quasi-contractualising48. 
Collective risks are attributed to insurances, the state or large business ("deep
43Cf. Grimm, ibid.
^Cf. N. Brunsson, The Irrational Organization, Chichester, 1985; id., The Organization 
of Hypocrisy, Chichester 1989.
45Cf. Favereau, ibid.
4<Cf. J. Rasmussen, Event Analysis and the Problem of Causality, in: D. Brehmer/J. 
Leplat/id. (eds.), Distributed Decision-making: Cognitive Models of Cooperative Work, 
Chichester 1991, p. 248.
47Vgl. nur Th. Meder, Schuld, Zufall, Risiko, Frankfurt/M. 1993; id., Risiko als Kriterium 
der Schadenszuteilung, Juristenzeitung 1993, 539.
“ For the evolution o f "hybrid" forms of interpenetration between market and organization 
cf. K. Imai/H. Itami, Interpenetration of Orgvanization and Market, J. o f Ind. Org. 1984, 285; 




























































































pockets")49, competition, as a process of searching, is, at least partially, 
removed through collective, strategic, organised search-processes50 - embracing 
complete action-networks - of combined firms, through arrangements between 
employees' organisations and employers' organisations or other organisations 
(parties, associations etc.)51. This system, which has also found expression in 
the legal system through the formation of a completely new legal class of 
collective, social and political institutions (collective agreements, public-law 
insurances, parties etc.) has, simultaneously, developed a kind of collision-order 
to attune these new institutions to the legal forms of classical liberalism, within 
which the new forms can be described as a remodelling of the older: group 
autonomies supplement individual freedom, group parity and equality of 
opportunity supplement individual, formal equality52. This co-ordination of new 
classes of law allows a mutual support. The collective-legal elements are limited 
to being able to make use of certain collective risks and achievements; equality 
of opportunity compensates for certain effects of the accumulation and self­
strengthening of social power. They also safeguard the conditions of operation 
of individual, classical liberal law in as far as they, in many cases, create for the 
first time the possibility of new, longer-term action-orientation and value- 
orientation: the value of the acquisition of specialist professional qualifications
49Cf. generally M. Douglas, Risk as Forensic Resource, Daedalus 1990 (no. 1), 1; ead./A. 
Wildavsky, Risk and Culture, Berkeley 1982.
50Cf. Hayek, ibid.; V. Vanberg, Spontaneous Market Order and Social Rules, Economics 
and Philosophy 1986, 75; M. De Vlieghere, A  Reappraisal o f F. A. Hayek’s Cultural 
Evolutionalism, Economics and Philosophy 1994, 285; J.M. Buchanan, The Market as a 
Creative Process, Economics and Philosophy 1991, 167.
51Cf. P. Haberle, ibid.; cf. also V. Neumann, Freiheitsgefahrdung im kooperativen 
Sozialstaat. Rechtsgrundlagen und Rechtsformen der Finanzierung der freien 
Wohlfahrtspflege, Kôln 1992, esp. p. 437.





























































































seems for many workers53 and their children more calculable, the safeguarding 
against job risks relieves families of the necessity of coping with the blows of 
misfortune or the consequences of individual wrong decisions and, thus, simulta­
neously facilitates the stabilisation of family relationships, particularly those of 
the working class. Conversely, the traditional legal class of the liberal rights of 
personal liberty and their institutionalising produces important achievements for 
the support of collective re-modellings through limitations and avoidance of 
risks: the attribution of individual responsibility54, supported by individualistic 
ideologies and the work ethic, means that insurance benefits or the newly won 
security in employment relations (through collective contracts) cannot be 
overtaxed through individual misuse (“moral hazard”).
b) Collective attribution of risks - social state remodelling of “the second 
order” and the problems of the self-description of complexity
The bringing within the scope of law of the former welfare grants55, 
which were legitimised religiously or patemalistically, is also to be interpreted 
against the background described. The possibility of a right to financial help to 
satisfy minimum demands presupposes the functioning of primary and secondary 
institutions of the social market economy56. This is also a variant of collective
53Cf. Goodin, ibid., 548.
^For the role o f discipline as a counterpart to legal institutions cf. Ph.S. Gorski, The 
Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and the State Formation in Holland and 
Pmssia, Am J.Soc. 1993, 265.
55Cf. for the jurisdiction in Germany only the decision of the Federal Court of 
Administration, BVerwGE 1, 159.
56Cf. generally Zacher, ibid.; N. Dimmel, Sozialrecht an den Grenzen sozialstaatlicher 
Rationalitàt, Ôst. Z. f. Politikwissenschaft, 1993, 57; for an economic perspective on the 
function of the State as an "insurance" organization against social risks cf. H.W. Sinn, A  




























































































risk-management, it cannot just be reduced to its distributive function. It must 
be related to the differentiated layer of indivdualistic and collectivistic 
institutions. Taking this into account it is characterised as an insurance benefit 
independent from a premium it has to remain an exception and has, therefore, 
primarily the function of compensating for the temporary cessation of 
employment income supplementing the public insurances in a strict sense; in 
particular, to facilitate the search for a new job or to cushion a, at most, small 
group of people from the diffuse risks of foundering amidst social complexity 
(failure of socialisation or the acquisition of basic disciplines, the 
interconnection of unfortunate and blamelessly-acquired burdens etc.).
One may criticise this supportive relationship between labour market and 
social security57, but it is precisely in this co-ordination that a cognitive 
orientation-achievement is contained which criticism cannot simply ignore58 
and for which functional equivalents must also be sought if alternative systems 
are developed. One cannot introduce new rights into the network of social 
institutions without considering the effect on its equilibrium. Observation of the 
consequences and prerequisites of the re-modelling of liberal-constitutional law 
through the institutions of the social state shows that the collective attribution 
of risks (in comparison to earlier, individual attribution) brings with it 
considerable changes, both cognitively and normatively. This reveals itself 
especially after a certain period of time when insurance against risk has become 
a matter of course and is no longer seen as the collective assumption of
the innovative approach of P. Rosanvallon, La nouvelle question sociale. Repenser l’Etat- 
providence, Paris 1995.
57Cf. Zacher, ibid., p. 24.
5SCf. St. Leibfried, Towards the European Welfare State? On Integrating Poverty Regimes 
into the European Community, in: S. Ferge/J.E. Kolberg (eds.), Social Policy in a Changing 




























































































primarily individually attributed risks. Furthermore, the extension of horizons of 
decision and of the entering into of longer-term individual and collective 
relationships - made possible through the new institutions - has its opposite side 
in that through collectivisation undesired side effects are produced to a greater 
extent and, because of this, their observation becomes more difficult since 
collective attribution of “group risks” can no longer be described by recourse to 
simple rules and regularities but, for its part, can only be described in terms of 
probabilistic-stochastic models, which have to reckon with numerous operational 
factors and, therefore, with uncertainty. Above all, the institutions of the social 
state produce a virtually constitutive self-referential risk of risk-regulation59: the 
traditional liberal “model of the first order”, which is based on the simple 
mechanisms of the individual attribution of responsibility, allowed distinctions 
between rule and exception, between right and wrong; distinctions which could 
and should be adopted into individual orientation. Collective risks whose 
constructions cannot be linked to simple attributions admit, however, of room 
for differing strategic interpretations of attributions and attribution-possibilities. 
Thus, the increase in the collective taking over of risk through organised 
institutions is normatively easy to introduce and establish, whilst observation of 
the consequences of institutional change is much harder60. The readiness and 
ability of institutions to adapt may be asserted even without sufficient experience 
or even in the face of bad experiences, because “purposeful” organisations can 
apparently deal with bad experiences through a normative change of purpose or
59Cf. generally A. Lindbeck, The Welfare State, Cheltenham 1993; A. Schiiller, "Meine 
Tasche, Deine Tasche", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3/12/94, No. 281, p. 17.
“ Cf. Ch. Twight, Channeling Ideological Change - The Political Economy o f Dependence 
on Government, Kyklos 1993, 497; S. Paugam, Les statuts de la pauvreté assistée, Rev. Fr. 
de Soc. 1991, 75; N. Herpin, L ’urban underclass chez les sociologues américains: exclusion 
sociale et pauvreté, Rev. Fr. de Soc. 1993, 421; D. Reynaud, Le chômage de longue durée: 




























































































in a normative redistribution of responsibility to others or by simply 
concentrating on their normative self-description; one can escape their difficulty 
the more easily as the longer-term nature of the decision-horizons of institutions 
has its reverse side in the deferment of consequences, and in the possibilities
- also in this respect again increased - of continually remaining artificially- 
construed attribution61. Consistently enough, this is carried to extremes in 
Communist organisations which connect their self-definition with the criterion 
of success and, as a consequence, explain a failed Communist organisation as 
being a (state-)capitalist one, therewith asserting “after the fact” the realisation 
of a risk, against which, however, no kind of institutional precautions had been 
taken.
c) The necessity of a meta-convention on the co-ordination of institutions 
with one another
For their part, there are no simple rules and connexion-patterns for the 
attribution of the consequences of collective decisions which are to overcome 
the limits of individual attributability, because institutionalised attributions
- unlike the universal regularity of liberalism - always bundle together a diffuse 
“group causality” which does not follow any general law and cannot assume any 
naturally layered, structure-formation-facilitating levels of complexity62 *. 
Attributions, for their part, are always in competition to others^ political 
organisations especially can declare even the greatest catastrophe to be a success 
since, in the end, one had the best intentions and had prevented the catastrophe
- which was, naturally, the responsibility of others - from being even greater!
61Cf. Brunsson, ibid.
62Cf. generally L. Kriiger, Kausalitât und Freiheit, Neue Hefte f. Philosophie 1992, p. 1;




























































































One of the secondary consequences of collective risk-attribution consists in the 
fact that there can no longer be a general rule for the institutionalising of 
responsibility in “special” organisations. According to the liberal legal paradigm 
of the universality of rules, an unemployed person has to expose herself or 
himself to the forces of price competition but unemployment, as a collective 
phenomenon, in no way excludes a strategy of wage increase, since, in order to 
deal with this problem, the re-distribution of the risk to others involved 
(employers, “better earners”) or the state can also be called into the arena63. 
The state, above all, has in this constellation the task of making a risk invisible 
through dispersal64. This is the social policy counterpart of the policy of the 
“high chimney” cultivated earlier in environmental law: one mixes attributable 
dangers with others into a risk which is no longer attributable, in the hope that 
this will go well. In environmental law, the risks of this form of risk 
management have long since been recognised but it is, however, still barely 
accepted that this form of risk management has an internal social counterpart, 
namely, the emergence of complex risks with chains of causality65 which are 
difficult to structure.
A kind of meta-convention is, therefore, needed which attunes the 
achievements of collective institutions to one another66; for this, the
“ For the causes of growing unemployment cf. D.J. Snower, Why People don’t Find 
Work, CEPR, Discussion Paper Series no. 883, Dec. 1993; P. Krugmann, Inequality and the 
Political Economy of Eurosclerosis, CEPR, Discussion Paper Series no. 867, Nov. 1993; cf. 
also H. Siebert, Geht den Deutschen die Arbeit aus?, Miinchen 1994.
“ Cf. Aronson, ibid., and generally M. E. Streit, Cognition, Competition, and Catallaxy. 
In Memory of F.A. v. Hayek, Constitutional Political Economy 1993, 223.
65Cf. for a model coping with unemployment Krugmann, ibid.
“ For the role o f conventions and mles in decision-making under conditions of uncertainty 
and complexity cf. Orlean (ed.), ibid.; Heiner, ibid.; D.C. North, Institutions and Credible 
Commitment, J1TE 1993, 11; id., Economic performance through time, Am.Ec.Rev. 1994, 




























































































remodelling of the liberal constitutional state through the group-pluralistic state 
had developed an approach which functioned with varying degrees of success 
in the countries of the European Union but which requires renewal under the 
now more complex conditions. What, with justice, is known as Eurosclerosis67 
is a consequence of complexity which is no longer manageable68. The 
formation, however, of such a meta-convention for the co-ordination of the 
institutions of the "society of organisations" with still-existing institutions of the 
liberal "society of individuals", which serves the limitation and management of 
collective risks through the formulating of collision and transfer rules, meets 
with considerable resistance. It is precisely the functioning of the co-ordination 
of institutions up to now which has created conditions for its overloading69 and 
made it simultaneously invisible because of the diffuse effects and the long term 
nature of the developments70. Especially recently, organisations and institutions 
have been confronted with expectations which amount to a hybrid combination 
of elements of the paradigm of individual right and that of the social state: they 
are considered as large individuals who, unlike “small” individuals, are released 
from the constraints of the universality of rules and whom one can, therefore, 
burden with all possible claims and projections without reflecting more precisely 
on the pre-requisites and consequences of organisational problem-
JITE 1994,145; J. Bendor/D. Mookherjee, Institutional Structures and the Logic o f Ongoing 
Collective Action, A P SR 1982,129; E. McClennen, Justice and the Problem of Stability, Phil, 
and Public Affairs 1989, 3.
67Cf. Krugmann, ibid.
68For an ethics o f complexity cf. E. Morin, "E. Morin: philosophe de l’incertain", in: 






























































































management71. Thus, especially for social (non-economic) organisations, the 
typical conditions for “superstitious learning” are created: organisations interact 
- other than individuals who have to behaviour more in accordance with existing 
social conventions - with other organisations with the help of their own self- 
created, cognitive constmctions and projections and produce, thereby, a 
problematical self-referentiality72 which always demands merely “more of the 
same”, a phenomenon which in no way excludes this being simultaneously 
clearly recognised and criticised by other organisations. This is, above all, a 
problem with which “social” institutions and organisations are confronted and 
that is assimilated in an erratic fluctuation between over-charge and depression 
on the part of the personnel73. A tendency to hybrid linking of collective and 
individualistic institutionalising of risk attribution also finds expression in 
victimisation, which is especially widespread in the USA and Germany74: 
certain groups of people (whose number tends to be increasing) are generally 
declared as “victims” who have a right to collective insurance and pension 
benefits or at least to special care, whilst, conversely, the collective risk, which 
has realised itself in the victims, is simultaneously personally attributed to 
certain (similarly said to be increasing in number) people or groups of people 
on the basis of a personal characteristic or a partial contribution to diffuse chains 
of effect, according to traditional, individual criteria ("the culprits are in 
Bonn"!). This hybridising of personal and collective responsibility for risks 
































































































the “setting signs of solidarity” through gestures of good will75.
This "hybrid" linking of collective and individual responsibility missing 
the complexity of institutional inter-dependencies is especially characteristic for 
a "déformation professionnelle" of the social workers. On the other hand, the 
relatively paltry individual tax contribution of the “normal citizen” permits a 
diffusion of responsibility, to which, for its part, no complex side-effects are 
attributed, whilst the “social provision” of clients can thus become an object of 
individual positive rights which are located on the same level as their "negative" 
counterparts. This construction seems, however, inappropriate from both sides: 
neither under the conditions of the change of “social epistemology”, the 
appearance of undesired side-effects in the thinking and behaviour of the 
“normal citizen” can be neglected, because the gradualistic dispersion of rising 
taxes largely presupposes a behaviour of contributors as "rational ignorant" 
citizens who, while not openly opposing, take revenge surreptitiously, i.e. by tax 
evasion or by trying to get compensation by claiming "social assistance" 
themselves. Nor does the construction of individual rights to social benefits do 
justice to the, in general, weakened connexion of many social welfare recipients 
to the possibilities, as to the constraints, which are generated through the 
multiplicity of the social relationship-networks. Only a change in state 
intervention can do justice to both sides of this problem. The “result-orientated” 
compensation for negative rights to personal liberty through positive benefit laws 
ignores the relationship between centre and periphery within the legal system 
and does not do justice to the new conditions of social complexity and diffuse 
causality.
75For a critique of sentimental "solidarity" cf. P. Bruckner, L’arbitraire du coeur, Esprit 






























































































In this intermediary remark, a reversion shall again be made to the 
criticism of the dominance of moral-ethical arguments in the discussion about 
welfare rights. Its claim not only stands in inverse proportion to its practical 
significance - in practice the moral obligation to solidarity with the weak is 
nowhere seriously disputed, at least, not without serious consideration regarding 
the practical means of its realisation. The over-estimation of the moral argument 
is, rather, an expression of the insufficient readiness and capacity to accept that 
highly complex problems of self-observation and self-description of society and 
of the process of its self-modification accompanying the collective attribution 
of risks. A look back at the orientation-achievements of the liberal legal 
structure shows especially that neither through the “materialisation” of the 
formal position of the citizen nor through the institutionalising of an ethical 
super-discourse of understanding about conditions of the justice of social order 
can anything be contributed to the management of the self-created complexity 
of a post-modern society, but, much rather, access is obstructed to a functional 
equivalent of the orientation-achievements of the liberal-constitutional state 
model for the emerging "society of self-organising relationship-networks". 
Therewith, hybrid combinations of collective and individual attributions are 
furthered, conversely, however, the necessity of the development of an ethic of 
institutions which does justice to complexity, is also missed. Taking up the 
problem outlined of the self-description of society, I shall deal in the following 
first with the question in how far the orientation-achievement of the paradigm 
of individual rights offers connexion-constraints and connexion-possibilities in 
the development of new, cognitive orientation-models of complex societies. In 
this, it will be assumed that the organisations of social pluralism hitherto have 




























































































have, thereby, taken up the institutional achievements of the classical, liberal 
constitutional state model. The problem may be put more precisely to the effect 
that signs of a weakening of the remodelling of liberalism, already described, 
through the formation of corporatistic institutions - also with regard to the 
cognitive orientation-achievements thereby facilitated - demand new 
descriptions.
4. A new cognitive model for the self-description of the social state of the 
“second order”
a) The phenomenon of the complexity of regulation problems
The liberal legal model operates, as shown, with differences and 
attributions which facilitate co-operation and, with regard to the effectiveness 
hoped for through self-limitation76, does not ignore but does indeed neglect 
certain undesired consequences. In this, it is assumed that, by this means, trust 
can be generated77 and learning capacity guaranteed78. The social state has re­
modelled, but not simply replaced, the cognitive achievements of this system by 
creating new, collective risk-attributions and new institutions for the generating, 
storage and dissemination of knowledge of a stochastic-probabilistic type.
The characteristic feature of an emerging, new evolutionary step in the 
development of the legal model of the industrialised states consist - though this 
may be asserted only at the cost of some simplification - in the fact that more 
and more phenomena of complexity arise which can no longer be described and
76Cf. D. Schmidtz, Rationality within Reason, J. o f Phil. 1992, 445; id., The Limits of 
Government, Boulder/San Francisco 1991; North, ibid.; McClennen, ibid.
"Cf. Seligman, ibid., (Trust ...)
78For the necessity o f the institutionalization o f learning capability in society cf. H.A. 




























































































managed in the re-modelled institutions of the social state. In the field to be 
analysed here, this is true, above all, of the change of forms of organisation and 
work within and between firms75 *9, of the development of professional 
qualifications80 which can no longer be precisely distinguished, and the change 
in the forms and contents of orientation-knowledge, to name simply a few 
manifestations. Relatively permanent standardisation forms which accompany 
mass society are increasingly transferred to a flexible functional combination 
aimed at continual change81. Demands on the labour force are increasing and 
becoming more varied, on the other hand, technology becomes more flexible82 
and the change between the forms of contract and organised co-operation is 
made easier83. From this, there also emerge new problems for the 
representation of group interests in the institutions of the social state84; their 
cognitive functions are called into question, in particular the unification and 
standardisation of interests in collective forms of co-ordination; this is true 
especially of trade unions, but also of parties85. The traditional forms of social
75Cf. M. Crozier, L’entreprise à l ’écoute, Paris 1991; id., Etat moderne, Etat modeste,
Paris 1991; id., Le changement dans les organisations, Rev. Fr. d ’Admin. Pubi. 1991, 349.
“ Cf. M.J. Piore/Ch. F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity,
New York 1984.
81For a theoretical Reconstruction of the enterprise cf. J.L. Le Moigne, Systémographie
de l ’entreprise, Rev. Int. de Systémique, 1987, 499; G. Sapelli, Forme d’impresa e sviluppo
dei mercati, in: G. Origgi(ed.), Il divenire dell’impresa, Milano 1993, p. 21; Nonaka, ibid.
82Cf. G. Dosi, Sources, Procedures and Macro-Economic Effects o f Innovation, J. of Ec. 
Lit. 1988, 1120.
“ For the analysis o f complex long-term contracts cf. Ch. Joerges (ed.), Franchising and 
the Law, Baden-Baden 1991; G. K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law 
of Incomplete Contracts, Stanford L.R. 1990, 927.
“ Cf. for the role o f trade unions Rosanvallon, ibid.
“ For the effects o f this process on the evolution of the administration, cf. K.-H. Ladeur, 




























































































representation can no longer be unproblematically attuned to the new variants 
of the heterogenity and flexibility of functional organisation and co-operation.
One of the new phenomena is also the appearance of long-term 
unemployment86 which decreases very little, if at all, even in times of more 
favourable economic development, and whose description makes visible the 
limits of the cognitive possibilities of the institutions of social-state. The 
explanation of long-term unemployment is the object of a controversy 
symptomatic of the problems of the self-description of complex societies 
indicated above. Various organisations and groups each attempt to present their 
respective points of view in public and to push the responsibility onto another 
organisation. There are substantial counter-arguments against all explanatory 
models. Against the background of the developments to increase social 
complexity, described above, the assumption seems the most plausible - without 
this assertion here being made more precise - that we are concerned with a 
phenomenon of diffuse causality to which a multiplicity of factors have 
contributed whose causes cannot easily be traced bade87. Interestingly enough, 
at a time when, in ecological discussions, the phenomenon of complexity and 
obligation to decide under conditions of uncertainty gains more and more 
recognition, in discussions concerning social causality, the search continues for 
a uniform, problem-solving strategy. This is the more peculiar as the 
phenomenon of increased social complexity as such is not denied; nevertheless, 
the institutionalised discussion of simple alternatives prevails: one tendency 
wants to change the co-ordination of individual paradigm and its remodelisation 
by the social-state in favour of the first component (neo-liberalism) and to make 
possible more individual responsibility, the other tendency seeks to mobilise the
“ Cf. Snower, ibid.; Krugman ibid.




























































































responsibility of the state to compensate for the observed functional weakness 
of the market economy by re-distribution and state intervention. One may also 
observe here the phenomenon of “superstitious learning”: although in all 
Western European countries, the state itself, its organisation and its achievement, 
have been weakened to a much greater extent by the processes outlined than has 
the private economy88, and though its capacity to solve problems in many areas 
approaches that of the destroyed socialist state, the normative claim of the state 
- to be potentially responsible for everything - is simply taken to be literally 
true: although its present tasks already threaten to overtax the state, it should 
also “create jobs”, without it ever being seriously questioned which cognitive 
efficiency the state can develop for this.
b) The new "social epistemology"
The central problem, however, according to the above, seems to consist 
first in the fact that - to take up the example once more - neither the causes of 
long-term unemployment will be easy to explain nor, as a consequence, will it 
be easy to determine which strategy with relatively great probability will at least 
not lead to a worsening of the problem or to its being pushed into another field 
of activity. Here also, environmental policy supplies some painful learning 
processes89: it is not seldom that good intentions have proved to be bad 
advisers.
It would depend, therefore, first also on acceptance of the assumption that, 
with the increasing complexity of society, new forms of the collective, no longer
88Cf. M. Crozier, ibid., (Etat ...); H. Mentzen, Schlanksheitskur ffir den Staat, 
Frankfurt/M.-New York 1994; D. Grimm (ed.), Staatsaufgaben, Baden-Baden 1994.
89Cf. generally J. Leca, Sur le rôle de la connaissance dans la modernisation de l ’Etat, 




























































































rule-orientated, but flexible, functional combination of development-possibilities, 
(“scenarios”), overtax the risk management of the stably organised pluralism of 
the social state, including its cognitive-constructive forms of self-description. 
Cognitive forms attuned to rapid self-transformation, for their part, may only be 
understood as integrated into a dynamic process90: the new model of a “social 
epistemology” should above all be adapted to the fact that activity is much more 
closely combined with cognition and, thus, the idea of a permanently 
formulatable explicit rule-observance which separates the general and the 
particular must be abandoned91. This is a consequence of the accelerated self­
transformation of society.
The constructive moment of self-observation and external observation92 
gains in significance when the stable distinctions and attributions are superseded 
by variable, functional distinctions. By this, the search for new, permanent, 
stable rules is made impossible, its place must be taken by strategic model 
formation under conditions of uncertainty93: as a standard of correctness, only 
the “viable”, self-confirming practice can be valid, which has to be explicitly 
attuned to learning, in a provisional rationality of experimenting with 
relationing-possibilities. In such a context characterised by complexity, 
modelling distinguishes itself from the norm, as from the prognosis, in that it 
integrates through a multi-factor prospective method specialist knowledge and 
action, thus, does not presuppose the separation of knowledge (norm) and
“ For political and constitutional consequences cf. Grimm, ibid., (Die Zukunft...); for the 
evolution of social conflicts cf. Rosanvallon, ibid.
91Cf. Leca, ibid.
“ Cf. generally N. Luhmann, Beobachtungen der Modemen, Opladen 1992.
93Cf. generally G. Kampis, On the Modelling Relation, Cybernetics and Systems 1988, 
131; G.F. Lanzara, Capacità negativa, Milano 1993, esp. p. 24; T. Winograd/F. Flores, 





























































































This w ill not be dealt with in detail here. What must be emphasised for 
the purposes of this analysis, however, is that for the problems of increased 
complexity there can be no simple solutions, but only an experimental rationality 
of the drafting, testing and observation o f construction-models which are aimed 
at the observation and "scanning" of diffuse, social causality and side-effects on 
the possibility o f the generating o f new; practical knowledge and productive 
forms o f operating with and under conditions o f uncertainty95. Thus, on the one 
hand, the collective attribution of risks cannot simply be reversed, above all 
because the social assumptions of classical liberalism no longer exist. On the 
other hand, the durability of the collective processing o f risks is dependent on 
many pre-requisites, and it also always implies the development o f  strategies o f 
risk-avoidance and risk-limitation. Thus the assumptions of social work in 
society can also be destroyed, not least by those who are always demanding new  
benefits for their clients without even ever seriously taking into account in their 
model-assumptious the risk of undesired side-effects.
c) The problem of the co-ordination of institutions
Strategies for the collectivisation o f risks must integrate forms o f an active 
management of risks supplemented by the development also o f individual 
avoidance-strategies, which maintain the flexibility of coping with risks. In 
general, the solidarity, which in the form of a contribution to the safeguarding 
against the new risks o f accelerated self-modification of society can certainly be 
demanded, can only find its counterpart in a strategy o f the maintenance and
^Cf. J. Lesoume, Le futur et ses scénarios, Magazine Littéraire 312 (1993), 29; H.A.
Simon, Prediction and Prescription in Systems Modeling, Operations Research 1990, 7.




























































































improvement of individual and organisational adaptability96 to changing 
demands with which the state could link to the earlier cognitive achievements 
of the liberal model of law in a new and more complex variant of the reduction 
of, and the operating with, uncertainty. Thus, normatively new tasks97 must not 
be simply demanded from the state, much rather, it should be asked what its 
efficiency (and its limit!) was in the classical-liberal model of law and to what 
extent there have been maintained in this specific connexion-possibilities for the 
reconstruction of state problem-management under conditions of complexity.
The decisive change which the “second order” remodelling of the complex 
orientation-functions of the classical legal paradigm would have to display 
would consist, above all, in the recognition of a transition which does justice to 
the heterarchic-horizontal patterns of generation and combination of new 
possibilities and is aimed at the processing of stochastic-probabilistic forms of 
order-formation. In the following, an attempt will be made to sketch the outlines 
of a concept of proceduralisation98 which - in contrast to a substantial 
rationality orientated to rule-observance - has to model99 not only the spectrum 
of the possible options but also the domain of options, which can no longer be 
pre-supposed as anchored in law. In this, it must be accepted that ill-structured 
problems permit no permanent "deductive" rationality but can only be managed 
in experimental, interactive forms connecting knowledge and action.
MFor the fundamental role o f adaptability in complex societies cf. Simon, ibid., 
(Organizations ...); for cultural impediments o f its generation cf. D. Bell, Zur Aufklarung der 
Widerspriiche von Modemitat und Modemismus, Das Beispiel Amerikas, in: H. Meier (ed.), 
Zur Diagnose der Modeme, Munchen/Ziirich 1991, p. 21, 48.
’’Cf. H.A. Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, in: R.M. Hogarth/M.W. 
Reder (eds.), Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology, Chichester
1986, p. 25.
"Cf. Favereau, ibid.




























































































The reconstruction of the institutional infrastructure of society and its 
adaptation to uncertainty is confronted with problems which it is difficult to 
describe and which the monism of a moral-ethical discourse cannot do justice 
to. The institutionalised legal framework determines, above all, the production 
and acquisition of knowledge, which is necessary for the maintenance of 
individuals' relational ability in the face of rapidly changing demands100. This 
cognitive emphasis is the more important as it is especially the society of 
organisations which not only, like every society, generates productive and 
unproductive knowledge, but, to a far greater extent than the liberal society of 
individuals, is exposed to the risk of following destructive paths. Productive, 
knowledge-generating and knowledge-disseminating institutions produce beyond 
their field of validity self-reinforcing connexion-possibilities which are decisive 
for the longer-term stabilisation of society. The observation of to the traditional, 
liberal legal model is productive in so far as in the retrospective the assumption 
may be ventured that it is aimed systematically at the search for and the testing 
of alternatives and “uses” the individual for the construction of a network of 
informal conventions and co-operation-possibilities about which also, beyond 
explicit rules, an implicit knowledge, bound to the relationship-network, is made 
possible. This knowledge, which is dispersed throughout a complex network of 
interrelationships101 and cannot be systematised in explicit rules, is generated 
by the "discovery process" of competition102 as an emergent unintended side- 
effect of individual decisions. D. C. North103 has with justice pointed out that
100Cf. Dubet, ibid.
101Cf. M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, Garden City 1966; R. Mayntz, Modernization 
and the Logic of Inter-organizational Networks, Knowledge and Policy 1993, 3.
102Cf. Hayek, ibid.; cf. generally H. Bouillon, Ordnung, Evolution und Erkenntnis. Hayeks





























































































we still have difficulty understanding the development of adaptive, self- 
sustaining, productively self-re-inforcing, social sub-systems and the 
contributions to be made, by institutions. It is, however, precisely the revelation 
of these difficulties which is one of the enduring achievements of liberal law. 
It opens simultaneously connexion-possibilities for more complex descriptions 
which are focused on the management of new forms of uncertainty.
The cognitive problem outlined is determined in the area to be 
investigated here, above all, by the fact that a large part of the problems of those 
people who are, in the wide sense, dependent on social services, is only 
accessible through descriptions by the organisations or institutions104 who 
certainly have a vested interest, for example, in the maintenance of cost­
intensive programmes of care which at least secure the jobs of carers, whereas 
the responsibility for the maintenance of dependency can be otherwise attributed.
The non-liberal critique of liberal institutions, which from the outset focus 
on the management of uncertainty and, for this purpose, rely on a stock of plural 
mechanisms for searching and testing the new, was, and is, characterised by a 
lack of institutional thinking, which would enable a comparison of the 
advantages and disadvantages of competing models. This is even more valid for 
the strategy of "materialisation" and the discourse-ethical version of 
proceduralisation of civil rights as both variants more readily reduce the 
economic system to a system for the distribution of goods and ignore the 
autonomy of the problem of separation between and attribution of individual and 
collective responsibility or make it one subject of discourse-ethical public 
reflexion amongst others, without even making an attempt at an appropriate 
description of the economic system.
104Cf. E. Katznelson, The Welfare State as a Contested Institutional Idea, Politics and 
Society 1988, 517, de Swaan, ibid., p. 249 ss.; F. Perroux, Au delà du Welfare State, 




























































































First of all from looking back at the management of uncertainty through 
liberal institutions and, in particular, the necessity of the maintenance of the self­
organisation of the sub-systems of society as a form of its processing, it follows 
that the direct “material” take-over of the responsibility for consequences by the 
state is itself a risky strategy because the state especially, as an organisation, has 
numerous possibilities for their dispersal which make difficult the observation 
of the question of attribution.
d) "Hybridisation" of the culture - the reverse side of the weakening of 
traditions
The weakening of traditions - reproduced through implicit practices, 
routines and values - which take place under pressure of the accelerated self­
modification of society, increases the significance of explicit cultural mediation 
and, simultaneously, makes more difficult its adjustment to, in particular, the 
system of production. Under conditions of complexity, a learning of the second 
order is necessary, that is, the generating and maintenance of a procedural 
capacity to leam; learning of the first order (internalisation of relatively stable, 
substantial values) is no longer sufficient. The paradoxical combination thus 
required, of long-term relational ability and short-term, flexible adaptability 
seems to overtax, at least in part, families and schools especially; at least, up to 
now hardly any orientation formulae have been found which are practicable and 
which can be put into operation. The consequence of this development is a 
hybridisation of culture: on the one hand, its achievements for the “mobile” 
society become more and more important, on the other hand, under conditions 
of complexity, its contributions to the development of forms of mutual 
adjustment between social sub-systems, including culture itself, weaken. Thus 




























































































aims (self-determination and self-realisation, “ecology”, peace, equality, harmony 
etc.) with a claim to immediacy and which remains institutionally 
underdeveloped. Whilst earlier, differing variants of discipline opened access for 
differing social classes to the constraints and possibilities of a presupposed 
reality for today’s culture a diffuse heterogeneity of variants of self-realisation 
is characteristic, a heterogeneity characterised by unmanaged complexity and 
which, in the end, paradoxically reinforces inequality because it overtaxes the 
“sorting” and orientation achievement of the family. Its weakening releases more 
and more variants of a negative individualisation which is characterised by a 
lack of connexion-ability and adaptability to socially imposed obligations or by 
a lack of the ability to operate productively with the possibilities thereby 
created. Investments in longer-term developments are thus - contrary to the oft- 
expressed claims - impeded, because there is a lack of institutionalisation. 
Connected with this, is the risk of a process of de-civilisation: the reproduction 
of flexibility and adaptability, of orientation-knowledge which makes actions 
possible and of social values which make possible behavioural adjustment, is 
blocked by the increased possibilities of following negative, individualistic paths 
(drugs, violence, lack of willingness to learn, self-isolating subcultures etc.). 
Since these phenomena apparently arise precisely in those youthful years when 
learning ability is at its peak, problems with long-term repercussions are created 
as a matter of course, problems which later can only with difficulty be 
compensated for in many cases, even with lavish social integration aid105 (cf. 
also below).




























































































5. Coupling social policy and industrial relations
a) "Workfare" or the subsidising of low wages?
Longer-term unemployment is always accompanied by the risk of the loss 
of qualifications and of work discipline. The “payment of work instead of 
unemployment” is, however, contrary to appearances, in no sense a simple 
strategy106 because the creation by the state of new jobs is inevitably linked 
to the risk of endangering other jobs or the opening up of unproductive paths 
of development. This is especially true of the creation of jobs in the state sector 
itself: the division of labour can have thoroughly negative repercussions for 
work motivation if the feeling of being really needed is thereby lost. The same 
is also true of so-called “workfare”107, if, and to the extent that, the 
“employment” aim becomes an aim in itself and the control of part-time workers 
with few hours in public administration additionally leads to the dilemma that 
the alternative of non-work would itself be, from the perspective of the social 
administration, an undesirable effect.
The incentive to create new jobs requiring low-level qualifications in the 
private sector is something which should be considered very seriously as a
106Cf. J.L. Laville, Etat et société au défit de la solidarité, Esprit 1994 (no 8/9) 69; B. 
Eme/id., Cohésion sociale et emploi, Paris 1994; generally Siebert, ibid.
107Cf. L. Mead, Beyond Entitlement. The Social Obligations of Citizenship, New York 
1986; id., The New Politics o f Poverty. The Nonworking Poor in America, New York 1992; 
for a critique cf. M. Gilbert, Why the New Workfare Won’t Work, Commentary 1994 (May), 
47; see also L.A. Jacobs, Rights and Deprivation, Oxford 1993, esp. p. 198; Rosanvallon, ibid. 
(La nouvelle question sociale...), p. 170 ss.; S. Danziger/D. Veinberg (eds.), Fighting Poverty: 
What Works and what Doesn’t, Cambridge/Mass. 1986; for an economic analysis see T. 
Besley/S. Coate, Workfare versus Welfare: Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in 




























































































candidate for a public experiment aimed at supplying new possibilities10 *08. The 
tendency to eliminate such jobs is so often described that it can hardly be called 
into question. This is connected not least to rigid, collectively agreed 
regulations, which show simultaneously that, and how, the production of 
undesired effects can be linked with the process of standardisation characteristic 
of social state group-pluralism (corporatism). Collective agreement does, indeed, 
in many cases, aim at an increase in the income for low-level qualification jobs 
via a “social” component of fixing the wages; simultaneously, however, 
precisely through this an incentive is created to eliminate such jobs. On the 
other hand, there actually exists in this area the danger of creating a social un­
derclass of “working poor”109 who cannot live on their wages alone. In order 
to deal with this problem the instrument of the (graded) wage subsidy has been 
suggested110 which is intended to create a wage incentive but, on the other 
hand, avoid the social danger described, as well as maintain the distance
10SFor an explanation of long-term unemployment cf. Snower, ibid.; Krugman, ibid.; Ch.
R.Bean, European Unemployment: A  Survey, J. of Ec. Lit. 1994, 573; Reynaud, ibid.; critical
sociologists back the assumption that the solution of the problem of long-term unemployment
lies outside the labour market, cf. C. Offe, Arbeitsgesellschaft, Frankfurt/M.-New York 1984, 
p. 104 ss.; G. Vobruba, Die Entkopplung von Arbeit und Einkommen, Widerspruch 1989, 79; 
but leading economists quite plausibly point to the fact that there is no clear relationsip 
between the rise of productivity and the rise of long-term unemployment. For the popular 
illusion of public re-distribution of work cf. P. Boisard, Partage du travail: les pièges d’une 
idée simple, Esprit 1994 (no. 8/9), 44; the idea of "uncoupling" welfare and labour relations 
comes close to a kind of "socialism within capitalism" with all the risks that led "real 
socialism" into failure.
109Cf. generally Herpin, ibid.; G. Lafer, The Politics of Job Training, Politics and Society 
1994, 349.
110Cf. esp. E.S. Phelps, Low Wage Employment Subsidies versus the Welfare State, Am. 
Ec. Rev. (papers and proceedings) 1994 (no. 2), 54; D J . Snower, Converting Unemployment 
Benefits into Employment Subsidies, Am. Ec. Rev. (papers and proceedings) 1994 (no. 2), 
65; P. Dehez/J.P. Fitoussi, Revenue minimum, allocations -chômage et subventions à l ’emploi, 
Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Economiques, Paris, Nov. 1993; Ph. van Parijs (ed.), 
Arguing for Basic Income. Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform, London 1992; critically 




























































































between the next highest group of “marketable” workers. The possibilities this 
offers for misuse are clear to see: in economically weak branches, trades unions 
and employers could come to an agreement about such wages and thus impede 
an adaptation of the system of collective agreement to the economic framework. 
Nevertheless, the testing of this model must be considered in face of the danger 
of the development of an underclass completely cut off from working life and 
economic life. It could be considered to allow the opening up of this possibility 
only through collective agreements which, with regard to the possibilities of 
misuse mentioned above, would have to be judged and evaluated in their 
execution by independent experts with the co-operation of welfare associations.
This strategy differs from conventional, traditional, public job creation 
measures in that the market value of the work achievement is more emphasised 
and, therefore, integration into a (private) enterprise follows more readily111. 
It would be a strategy which is, in no sense, risk-free, but which could partly 
protect a part of the poorly-qualified workforce from the risks of accelerated 
self-modification of the economic system without exhausting itself in mere 
financial compensations. Such a solidarity contribution by better-earning 
employees would be - and this is a point - easier to justify precisely because the 
subsidised employees would indeed make a contribution within the framework 
of their possibilities, which, for example, could also be that the tendency to 
“rationalise away” services would be curbed. This conception could also be 
more plausibly linked to the existing network of institutions and the process of 
its self-transformation.
Those experiments already carried out with wage subsidies show clearly, 
however, that the mere (re-)distribution of work is no simple solution. To a large
m The State can fulfill its function as a kind of basic public "insurance organization" by 
reducing the risk of employing long-term unemployed people, cf. for a German governmental 




























































































extent, the attempts proceed, for various reasons, very unconvincingly, above all, 
because - as indicated above - the capacity for longer-term commitments, for 
integration into and adaptation to the possibilities and obligations of complex, 
social relationship-networks is under-developed and the readiness for risk- 
behaviour is over-developed.
b) The necessity of co-ordinating social policy programmes with the totality 
of institutions
The structures of employment promotion cannot and will not be examined 
in detail here. Some examples will merely be given to show that, and why - this 
is also to be asserted in connexion with the recourse to the classical, liberal 
model of law - the necessity for new, collective conventions and descriptions of 
risk-attribution and risk-distribution continues to exist. The weakening of the 
group-pluralistic “meta-convention” has given rise to clienteleism which turns 
into rent seeking to the disadvantage of third parties. Readiness to set up new 
conventions including external interests is declared and, simultaneously, made 
dependent on conditions which are hard to fulfil, and again are addressed to the 
state or other collective actors. In this way, possessions and status may be 
successfully defended but in this way a long-term erosion of the capacity for 
social commitment is produced. Collective bargaining processes had pre­
supposed the cognitive orientation-function of the corporatist order 
standardisation, and the conventions based upon it. But once this framework is 
severed because the domain of options itself is no longer given the risk that 
collective bargaining will lock in as a rent-seeking process is quite high.
The formulation of a new “meta-convention” is only possible on the basis 
of a stable, inter-organisational compromise which on the other hand is as 




























































































to orientation at short term benefits112. But as the interdependence in national 
neo-corporatist settings is much more evident a new frame of interorganisational 
reciprocity should be conceived of.
The commitments to be set up cannot be made in legally binding forms 
but it would be important to find a new functional equivalent to the diversity of 
relationship-networks, guaranteed on the first level of the liberal model by 
security of expectation and trust, after the social state model of inter- 
organisational networks of the communication between pluralistic groups on the 
basis of the standardising-achievements of mass production (which in the past 
made possible a thoroughly presentable cognitive order-formation) has at least 
partly lost its efficiency. The chances of this are, unfortunately, not good in the 
medium term because in the meantime in the traditional, representative 
organisations, despite decreasing integration-achievement, there is still little 
readiness to get involved in new modellings geared to complexity with which 
new spheres of possibility can be designed and tested. Precisely the comparison 
with the classical, liberal model shows that a society can generate new 
possibilities out of the extension of its perception of problems and decisions; 
possibilities which improve welfare as a whole. The insufficient institutional co­
ordination of the descriptions of reality is also reflected in the unclear co­
ordination of collective and individual risk-attributions.
Society must increase the complexity of its institutionalised and 
operationalized self-description, communicative agreement within the framework 
of linguistically conveyed inter-subjectivity cannot do justice to this requirement.
I




























































































6. The necessity of the connexion between the institutionalising of social aid 
and the learning capacity of society
a) The co-ordination of organised, collective action and of social 
constructions of reality
A new self-observation of the economic and social system which does 
justice to complexity cannot have its aim in the depiction of invariant, social 
legitimacy but should, much rather, attempt to model global effects on the basis 
of incomplete information open to differing interpretations and achieve a 
strategic inter-organisational co-ordination between state and associations 
through agreement on aim-means-correlation. It must here been insisted that the 
concern is not with mere compromise formation, much rather, a new, procedural 
rationality - as shown - must accept that knowledge and action are far more 
closely bound to each other than under the validity of the liberal paradigm113, 
which presupposed stable regularities. An example of a productive-constructive 
connexion of the cognitive potentials of state, of associations and of a science 
offering mediation could consist in a model of a labour policy supported by a 
comparison of differing national systems, that had as its intention, within the 
rationality of the provisional and the experimental, the description and the 
relationing of global social variables and their dynamic as well as seeking to 
distinguish productive and unproductive correlations. Thus may be distinguished 
stability-orientated, passive and active social states, as well as those 
characterised by distribution struggles114; in this way, a frame of reference is
113Cf. Lesoume, ibid.
U4Cf. St. Huckemann/U. van Suntum, Beschaftigungspo-litik im intemationalen Vergleich, 
Lander-Ranking 1980-1993, (Bertelsmann-Stiftung), Giitersloh 1994; the accelerating process 
of self-modification of society has important consequences for the role of its "knowledge- 
basis": more and more dynamic-generative components o f prospective design linked to action 




























































































laid down which admits the relationing of differing variables and allows the 
formulating of hypotheses about their correlation with, in particular, long-term 
unemployment. The correctness of such a model cannot be proved; much rather, 
at most, a plausibility supported by practical testing is to be expected. In the 
perspective adopted here it would depend on connecting the descriptions with 
strategies for action which guarantee more flexibility and adaptability through 
generating new possibilities. In any case, the comparison of differing models 
reveals so many differences and confirms the supposition that institutions play 
an important role115 and the point is not to control the legitimacy of the 
economic system “from outside” through a moral system of the communicative 
rationality of argumentation. The proceduralisation of the model here outlined 
could consist in a constraint to a kind of self-evaluation of collective decision 
making with reference to side-effects and long term consequences.
The example of environmental policy shows that the management of 
complex problems can no longer be aimed at the winning of certain knowledge 
and the laying down of regularities before the decision, but that recognition and 
action must be connected with experimental forms of self-construction and self­
observation. This signals a basic change in social orientation-knowledge.
In complex societies, the appearance of diffuse, undesired results must be 
reckoned with no less than in the natural environment. The basic forms of the 
description of nature and society formerly developed parallel, the idea of social
I15Cf. generally J. G. March/J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, New York 1989, who 
accentuate the necessity o f coordination between the institutions o f society; cf. also D. Sutter, 
The Discovery of knowledge and Constitutional Systems: A  New Perspective on the
Provision of Public Goods, JITE 1994, 401. For the cognitive function of liberal economic 
policy ("Ordnungspolitik") cf. G. Wegner, Wohlfahrtsaspekte evolutorischen Marktgeschehens: 
Neo-klassisches Fortschrittsverstandnis und Innovationspolitk aus ordnungstheoretischer Sicht, 
Tubingen 1991, esp. p. 138 s. For environmental law cf. K.-H. Ladeur, Coping with 
Uncertainty: Ecological Risks and the Proceduralization of Environmental Law, in: G. 
Teubner/L. Farmer/D. Murphy (eds.), Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The 




























































































legalities corresponded to the natural law and the transfer from the description 
of events (and their legalities) to the formation of a model through the 
relationing of variables in natural science finds its correspondence in the social 
sciences in a provisional rationality of modelling and of experimentation116. 
This thinking in global modellings has the advantage that it operates with 
connexion-patterns which correspond to the new type of stochastic-probabilistic 
knowledge which the society of organisations has itself produced. The practical 
conversion of such approaches into negotiation systems could make clear that 
there are systems of co-ordination which function well and less well, that, in 
particular, there are more stationary paths of development tending to self­
blocking or that there are more dynamic, institutionalising and strategy variants 
which maintain their flexibility in different countries. It should then be asked 
how new self-blockings could be avoided and dynamic institution systems 
strengthened which maintain innovative capacity and generate diversity and 
flexibility. Differing variants of modelling should be developed which aim to 
develop new forms of the confrontation of society with self-created productive 
as well as unproductive compulsions and, thus, to include risk potentials, instead 
of letting them disappear in the complexity of the network of effects. The 
concern here is not, however, with new forms of the institutionalising of “exper­
tise” but with the connection of action, recognition and observation through 
practical modelling consequences. Thus, for example, it should be considered 
whether the system of collective agreement could not, in this way, be made open 
to a procedural rationality that would compel both parties to create models about 
the repercussions of the demands to be negotiated, according to a specific 
framework of criteria, and with this model, or, more precisely, with the probably 
two alternative models, to observe the subsequent economic development.




























































































Longer term, a kind of concerted action could emerge from this whose aim 
could consist not even in the laying down of a certain global model but, much 
rather, in the maintenance of the compatibility of plural models and, thereby, 
of the comparability of their results. The concern is, above all, to find, through 
explicit modelling, a functional equivalent to the earlier “social epistemology” 
of the liberal paradigm, which had been determined by simple pre-suppositions 
of causality and probability as well as individual attribution. This would be the 
practical consequence of the attempt made here to link up to the cognitive 
rationality of the liberal legal paradigm. In environmental policy, the 
instrumental rationality of simple attributions and interventions is in decline, in 
social policy, by contrast, the “end-of-the-pipe” strategy of distribution 
dominates.
In the following, these general reflections will be made more specific with 
regard to the social services.
b) Clientele-orientation as a symptom of the dissociation of social services 
and achievements from the system of social institutions
Firstly, it must be emphasised that precisely that clientele-orientation117 
which is widespread amongst social workers is extremely problematic: social aid 
and social services can only be legitimatised as social institutions of collective 
risk-management. This requires that administrative risk-management must be 
functionally controlled and that individual risk-avoidance and risk-limitation 
must be promoted. This means, further, that the contribution of the citizen must 
be honoured by the administration as well as by the recipients, a thesis which, 
in many cases, is denied by social workers both in theory and in practice
117Cf. Twight, ibid.; de Swaan, ibid., p. 249 ss.; J. Becker, Der erschopfte Sozialstaat. 




























































































because it is seen as being synonymous with a degradation of the recipients - 
quite unjustly because the forms of dealing with social aid through the 
administration carry much less weight also for the recipient than the perception 
by the public: if the granting of social aid through the public - because of 
widespread abuses or decreasing legitimisation of social aid in general - is no 
longer accepted and is seen as a compulsion, which may already be the case to 
a large extent, this has grave consequences for the status of the recipient which 
cannot be compensated for by the ideology of the social workers. Conversely, 
the decline in inhibitions about claiming social aid, but also the capriciousness 
of the benefit limits, leads to financial circumstances being, to a large extent, 
concealed, this state of affairs being encouraged by the banker's duty of se­
crecy118. Many social workers regard it as a law of “solidarity” when the new, 
in part striking injustices produced by the social state itself119, which are 
produced precisely within that group of people with a low or no income, are 
simply suppressed. It should also be mentioned that in Germany it cannot be 
recommended for an old person to have savings because, should this person 
need nursing care, the difference between pension and the now horrendously 
expensive costs for care are paid by the social security office, the savings only 
delaying the take-over of responsibility by the state. The representatives of 
nursing homes are already advising their clients semi-officially how they can 
rescue their savings. This is merely one indication that in this area a sense of 
injustice is, to an increasing extent, on the wane and this is completely 
understandable since an elderly person has to say to herself or himself that the 
social security office cannot actually be “better-off’ because she or he has saved
nsCf. from the perspective o f a German Mayor, Becker, ibid., p. 141 ss., 155; De Swaan, 
ibid., p. 255.
119The institutional weakness of moral theories of "social1' rights does not allow for any 




























































































money instead of spending it at once, as perhaps the person lying in the next 
bed has done.
The sum total of the losses arising through “social deception” may be 
small in relation to crimes connected with subsidies - an argument regularly put 
forward by the defenders of the social state system - but the politico-moral 
damage is, nevertheless, the greater because one cannot, without danger, 
dissociate social aid and social services from a duty to solidarity: the citizen, 
whose solidarity has become a bothersome compulsion, carries out her or his 
own form of revenge by cheating the state, especially in regard to the payment 
of taxes, a practice which is rapidly increasing, also in Germany where, 
formerly, honesty in tax matters tendenced to be at a high level. Especially in 
countries like Sweden and Denmark (but, to a certain extent, also in Germany), 
social benefits (outside the sphere of social aid!) are claimed to a great degree 
and especially from the relatively high-earning middle classes120. This is partly 
justified by the allegedly protective effect of a form of the granting of benefits 
which is non-discriminatory also towards the socially vulnerable. That schooling 
and higher education should, in general, be free of charge is, however, hard to 
justify.
The social sector (including those employed in the social services) has 
become so severely stretched in many social states that state payments can, 
therefore, no longer be perceived as compensatory because the system of re­
distributions and refunds has become fully incomprehensible121 and, because 
of its capriciousness with points of justice, it is hard to legitimatise it. How shall 
one, for example, regard the fact that an employee with a good income has to 
pay a socially graduated - that is, for him, a high - contribution towards the
120Cf. Lindbeck, ibid.; de Swaan, ibid., p. 255; Becker, ibid., p. 81; Ch. Howard, The 
Hidden Side of the American Welfare State, Pol. Sci. Q. 1993, 403.




























































































nursery school fees of his 5 years old child whilst the school education of his 
7 years old child is not only free of charge but the state also pays for drawing 
paper and crayons (“school equipment”)! Why should a member of the middle 
classes who has to pay a lot of money for the studies of his children who are 
studying away from home find it just that he also, through his taxes, has to pay 
for the studies of the ungifted and “unmotivated” children of his neighbour? He 
then “takes it into account” in his tax declaration.
The fact that many people do not see the ineffectiveness of the social state 
is because they themselves profit from it in one form or another and behave as 
"rational ignorants" with reference to the intransparent rules of the whole 
systehu
c) A comparison: liberal rights and the institutionalising of trust
i
The classical liberal paradigm of law was characterised precisely by the 
fact that through its distribution of veto positions it made possible the erection 
of a self-supporting network of relationships, through which network a great 
variety of new options were generated. Conversely, the knowledge implied in 
this network can be acquired by individuals in numerous ways and processed in 
decisions which, for their part, bring new possibilities to the system122. The 
paradigm guarantees normatively a high degree of adaptability and flexibility 
which is supported by the system of individual attributions. Principles which are 
difficult to manage or other “meta problems” which cannot be put into practice
122Cf. generally Hayek, ibid.; concerning the importance of trust for the evolution of the 




























































































or which would block the dynamics of the production of new possibilities are 
neutralised through the separation of private and public. The central significance 
of the maintenance of a productive, diverse knowledge-generating of network 
relationship recedes within the liberal model behind the right of defence aspect 
only because this effect can only be guaranteed indirectly through the system 
of institutions but not directly through aim-orientated measures123. The system 
itself rests on many assumptions, it is in no sense the product of sponaneous 
interindividual exchange processes but depends on the functioning of highly 
complex institutions, and not only legal ones124. In its self-description, 
however, it emphasises the functionability of the means (whilst non-liberal 
critique stresses the necessity of setting up a substantive rationality of purposes).
It is precisely the fact that this system of institutions rests on so many 
presuppositions which makes it thoroughly accessible to changes and extensions, 
especially those which react to new risk-potentials. It is decisive, however, that 
also in the institutionalisation of new forms of risk-management, the paradigm 
of "mediation" is observed, that is, that also under conditions of complexity only 
the increase of the readability and flexibility of the social relationship-network 
as a whole through adapted (“viable”) institutions can be striven for but not the 
direct “material” problem solution. This is, of course, merely a general rule, 
which admits of exceptions, which, however, there again - this also compels the 
necessary distinction between centre and periphery within a system of 
institutions - must be observed to see whether they influence the reactability of 
the a-centric self-organising network of interrelationships through undesired side 
effects.
I23Cf. generally A. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, New York 1992.




























































































For the new institutions of the collective attribution of social risks and 
their management (unemployment insurance, job creation, social aid etc.), the 
connexion to the general system of institutions is, therefore, necessary, a 
condition which can be considered as being completely fulfilled for the first re­
modelling through social state group pluralism (macro-corporatism), whilst for 
the second level of complexity of the social state this has become increasingly 
questionable.
The collective assumption of risk is based on a different type of 
knowledge, namely, probabilistic-stochastic knowledge which, consistently 
enough, also has to find a counterpart in a complex type of decision, namely, 
the formation of a model on the basis of experimental self-descriptions and 
external-descriptions. If social risks are generated through organisations and 
inter-organisational networks (and no longer spontaneously through the 
combination of individuals), the way of operating of the institutions of social 
risk-management must also be construed through modelling appropriate to the 
stochastic-probabilistic forms of knowledge. This process modelling is to be 
systematically so focused that no more unambiguous causal attributions can be 
stated. If, within the liberal frame of reference, “negative” right ("vis-à-vis the 
state") is disconnected from the indirect contribution to the maintenance of a 
network of relationships which makes possible trust and innovation, then this 
can be simultaneously regarded as the reason for the misconstruction of material 
social rights. They are reduced to the nature of a claim, whilst the question 
about the side effects, therewith associated, on the general readability of the 
relationship-network of society, functioning as a pool of variety, is averted; in 
an anti-thetical interpretation, to the construction of the “negative right”, the 




























































































the negative125. In this, however, it is misjudged that the relieving of the 
consequences of “negative right" relates only to the individual decision because 
the consequences cannot be observed in detail but, as a whole, trust is placed 
in the self-organisation capacity of the relationship-network. This is reflected in 
the imposition of an abstract legal commitment of the holder of a right: she or 
he doesn't (within the framework of the law) need to bother about the concrete 
consequences ensuing from the exercise of a right in the field of freedom of 
contract because she or he has a general duty only to the legal institutions which 
are to make possible a generalising of trust. A comparable duty of allegiance, 
namely, not to overtax the institutions for risk-management, therefore has even 
more to be combined with social rights. Moreover, the institutions of liberal law 
and of social aid in the wider sense (just as those of the group-pluralistic social 
state) must also, however, be linked to those of the liberal model of law. This 
can only ensue through a modelling of relationing-pattems, using the stochastic- 
probabilistic stocks of knowledge, which are no longer based on the observation 
of events but on the relationships between abstract variables. That such a model­
building attuned to the institutionalised management of complex risks is not only 
a necessity, but also a possibility, is shown by analyses which reveal wide 
differences between the social state models of various West European countries 
and which cannot be reduced to mere quantitative forms of distribution126. 
This is a kind of knowledge which must be reintroduced into the new 
institutions managing collective risks because the "natural" observation of
125The "bi-polar" construction of formal and substantive rights tends to ignore the positive 
side effects o f the exercise o f "negative" rights which generates new possibilities within the 
social pool o f information which can be used by other individuals, cf. K. Arrow, 
Methodological Individualism and Tacit Knowledge, Am. Ec. Rev. (papers and proceedings), 
1994 (no. 2), 1.
126Cf. Huckemann/van Suntum, ibid.; for the concept of modelling cf. also Lesoume, ibid.; 





























































































interrelationships between events and, therewith, the accumulation of experience 
is no longer a reliable mechanism of knowledge generation.
The liberal paradigm of law and its group-pluralistic re-modelling through 
the social state “of the first order” could still operate with relatively fixed 
assumptions of continuity and attributions whose basis had been the assumption 
of "natural" distinct levels of complexity. Causality assumptions can be 
considered as permanently stored decisions which can no longer be basically 
called into question in those descriptions of reality operating with them127. 
Complex societies, however, have themselves to construe and re-construe the 
“spheres of possibility”128 in which they operate, they can no longer assume 
a reality accessible to general experience which is prestructured through stable 
regularities. Therefore, it is also so important that social groups draw up co­
ordinated, strategic model-assumptions which integrate knowledge and action. 
The installation of “expertise” into political advice cannot guarantee this. Points 
of distributive justice should not distort the awareness that the primary concern 
is so to conceive institutions that they increase the readability of society in 
general. Wrongly construed institutions which do not do justice to innovation, 
and do not help society to confront itself with the consequences generated by 
its own reproduction process can set in motion a dangerous downward spiral. 
Under conditions of complexity, co-operation can no longer be guaranteed 
through rules of behaviour for individuals; much rather, the organisations, as the 
central attribution-units, have to accept non-decidability and to construe common 
spheres of possibility attuned to self-revision. Only through a system of the 
formation of conventions about “viable” constructions of possibility can the






























































































fragmenting of knowledge also be limited, whose complexity nowadays 
overtaxes the traditional institutions for the transmissions of social stocks of 
knowledge to succeeding generations, in particular, the family and the school.
7. Social administration - administrative rationality - social aid
a) Organisational problems of social administrations - the construction of 
social problems and their evaluation
If one looks at the function and position of social state and non­
governmental social bureaucracies and, in connexion with the above, links them 
to the other institutions of the organised social state and the liberal constitutional 
state, the hypothesis may be advanced that the - through moralising arguments - 
increased weight of the "materialisation" of social rights finds a not 
unproblematic support in the way these organisations see themselves129: the 
emphasising of “negative” formal rights characterised by the relieving from 
consequences, finds its counterpart in the fact that pre-requisites and 
consequences of paying benefits are made completely opaque through the 
bureaucracies130. In contrast, it would be important to attach once again the 
social services (in the wider sense) to the other parts of the system of 
institutions and, in particular, to take into account the maintenance and 
reinforcement of the readability of the relationship-networks of society as a
129For a system theoretical reconstruction cf. D. Baecker, Soziale Hilfe als 
Funktionssystem der Gesellschaft, Zeitschrift für Soziologie 1994, 93.




























































































whole131. This is only possible when one establishes priorities and emphases 
at the local and regional level, which are processed in models doing justice to 
complexity and are observed and evaluated in their “application”. In this, 
"materialisations" - whose abstractionism far exceeds that of the (allegedly) 
empty formalism of the liberal paradigm of law - have to be replaced by the 
subtly differentiated search for and description of risk-potentials, which par­
ticularly endanger the personal, familiar, local relationship-networks and their 
reactability. In this, it would need to be asked where means could be used most 
effectively and where the concern is, rather, with the guaranteeing of a minimum 
provision without the prospect of a mobilisation of autonomy. This aim can only 
be achieved when the narrow clientele-orientation of social work is replaced by 
a more comprehensive understanding of social welfare.
The social services must first correlate their aims and means more exactly, 
adjust their organisation to this and develop internal evaluation and control132. 
Only on the basis of well-structured management external evaluations which can 
assess the degree of aim-achievement are reasonable. Evaluation should not be 
equivalent to economising (= “saving”), much rather, it would be important, also 
on the level of the individual social services, - to design conceptions of social 
risk-management considering more precisely the situation of the recipient, 
setting priorities, modelling interrelationships, and developing monitoring 
programmes; on the other hand, however, programmes should also gain the 
acceptance of the citizens who pay. The rhetoric of "materialisation" and 
participation actually stands in a striking disparity to the intransparence of the 
social services with regard to the public, whose claim to democratic participation
131Many protagonists of the welfare state favour a separation of its institutions from those
of the "labour system", cf. Leibfried, ibid.; Vobruda, ibid.




























































































in fact is always being emphasised. The “moralising” approach of social work 
and of the social services in a wider sense corresponds to the - seen from the 
inter-disciplinary perspective - probably comparatively low standard of the 
professional competence of the caring professions133.
This is the more problematic as these professions practically monopolise 
the interpretation of the needs and living standards of their clientele. The group 
of the “dependents” is itself difficult to organise and, therefore, offers an ideal 
projection surface for outside interpretations. Also in this regard, the point would 
be to make clienteleism, which compensates for insufficient innovative capacity 
by “good intentions”, increasingly permeable for organisation-sociological, 
communication-scientific and other “external” observations.
The social services probably form the area of the administration which 
shows the greatest organisational and management deficits, the most failures and 
the hardest problems of motivation because hybrid demands again and again turn 
into depression134. Simultaneously, it is this administrative area which seems 
to develop the lowest readiness and ability for an effective organisationally- 
critical new orientation of the determination of tasks. Whilst in the 
administration, in fact, flexible management reforms attuned to self-revision and 
orientated on the contribution to be produced have long been tested, the new 
organisation of the social services remains, at least in Germany, largely reduced 
to a narrow clienteleism and has hardly developed any approaches towards the 
questioning of its self-descriptions - except, perhaps, in a self-mirroring which 
is, there again, much rather, unproductive and circular, as cultivated by the 
inexhaustible stream of psycho-literature. The weakening of the integration-





























































































achievement of traditional, representative organisations (industrial trades unions, 
parties etc.) and the extension of the public sector have, furthermore, the fatal 
consequence that the influence of the personnel directly interested in the 
administration (teacher, social worker etc.) has been intensified on the local and 
regional level135. This is true, in particular, of the parties whose basis of 
recruitment becomes ever narrower; a development which simultaneously gives 
more room to the influence of small, well-organised groups.
Characteristic of the mentality of the social administration, here certainly 
exaggerated, is an example from the city of Bremen136 which - and this is, at 
first, to be judged very positively! - had decided on the evaluation of their social 
services through an external organisation-analysis by independent experts; the 
completed investigation which - as the information published in fragmentary 
fashion in the daily newspapers revealed - had found a series of serious 
shortcomings, was then, however, returned to the external organisation as being 
“incorrect” and, was therefore, also refused general publication. We are not 
dealing here with a Conservative administration but with a Green-Liberal- 
Social Democrat one which impeded public discussion of an investigation it had 
itself commissioned, despite the great possibility at their disposal of rebuffing 
criticism. One part of the, incidentally, unspecified “rejection” by the authorities 
criticises the (extremely expensive) study, interestingly enough, precisely 
because the criticism is not “sensitive” enough and, therefore, could produce 
motivation-problems in the personnel!
One must naturally have understanding in individual cases for the 
problems of the evaluation of complex achievements and also concede to the
135Cf. Ladeur, ibid. (Von der hierarchischen Verwal-tung...).




























































































administration the possibility of experimentation (and, thereby, naturally also of 
error), but the hitherto usual opaqueness of the achievements of the social 
services is not only incompatible with the demands made on a modern 
administration for constitutionality and democracy, it intensifies the already 
widespread decrease in the citizens' sense of solidarity as they feel exploited and 
are denied respect for their achievements. This point of view, however, is 
beyond the perception of a large number of social workers who - despite all the 
uncertainty regarding professional standards and achievements - see themselves, 
rather, as social reformers who ascribe failures, from a perspective of 
victimisation, “to society”137, which is denied any claim to accountability.
Here also is shown an insufficient ability and readiness to describe social 
risks as management tasks to be put into operation, that is, unavoidably to be 
limited, a point of view which takes up the problem-construction of liberal 
institutions. What remains to be emphasised is that the establishing of priorities 
and the external as well as the internal evaluation are pre-suppositions of a co­
ordination of social services with the general, liberal and social state institutions 
of the first and second order. In this connexion, there is also the question of the 
efficiency of the private welfare organisations138, which are largely state- 
financed. Their method of working, which shows little positive difference from 
that of the authorities is, likewise, especially as regards financial matters,
I
137Cf. Becker, ibid., p. 25.
138Cf. generally Becker, ibid., p. 141 ss., 155; for the necessity o f a new "inter- 
organizational'1 meta-convention cf. Ph. C. Schmitter, Five Reflections on the Welfare State, 
Politics and Society 1988, p. 503; for the necessity o f an institutional ethic cf. W. Schmitz, 
Ordnungsethik - Versuch einer Klârung ihres Gegenstandes und der Dimension ihres 
Eigenlebens, Zeitschrift fiir Wirtschaftspolitik 1952, p. 213; for the epistemological 
consequences o f the change of the hierarchical structure of society into the flexible network 
of inter-relationships cf. R. Mayntz, Modernization and the Logic o f Inter-Organizational 




























































































unclear. The state cannot control the efficiency of the achievements. Here also, 
forms of evaluation must be found which increase the flexibility and readability 
of these organisations. In this context we have to think of the possibility of a 
general invitation of tenders for specific services, the testing of the various 
service strategies of the various organisations responsible, and the making of 
agreements about quality assurance, evaluation and financial control.
b) Social justice and the vicious circle of its establishment
The widespread tendency in several European countries (in contrast to the 
USA and its “policy for the poor139”) to distribute social benefits according to 
universal rules, without reference to need, is, indeed, worth discussing. This is, 
above all, justified by the avoidance of the discriminatory effect of a “policy for 
the poor”. This advantage is of no great consequence, especially because it is 
purchased with considerably greater disadvantages. In the working and middle 
classes this bestowing of benefit without need (e. g. learning materials at school, 
higher school education) can further a grasping mentality which is, anyway, 
widespread: one pays too high taxes as it is and so pursues the aim of getting 
as much back again as possible. Precisely the number of forms and standards of 
re-distribution and restitution (formal equality stands next to “social 
differentiation”) by now has little to do with social justice and is suited to 





























































































Probably it would be more useful to increase precisely those social 
infrastructure services which can only be used collectively (building 
improvements in parts of the city, support for associations, self-help groups etc.) 
instead of promoting “non-discriminatory” granting of benefits and services for 
all, with senseless widespread effects and problematic repercussions on the 
relationship of the citizens to public institutions. Also this must not be 
synonymous with a “policy for the poor” in the nineteenth century sense.
This variant of social intervention may also be better linked to the 
traditions of liberal law and the orientation on indirect effects producing 
connexion-constraints which characterise them: it should be considered that the 
state should “replace”, by the introduction of new possibilities, the maintenance 
of the diversity of social relationship-networks which has been “used”, in a way 
which overtaxes the self-organisation-capacity of society, by the accelerated 
strategic intervention of organisations and thereby created rigidities. This is 
valid, above all, for (further) education, the maintenance of the structure of local 
associations, the compensation of greater mobility by the selective strengthening 
of local, collective communication and care institutions etc.
In the interests of the maintenance of a longer-term commitment of 
individuals and the readability of social relationship-networks, it would also 
depend on strengthening and supporting the family. Apart from this, it would 
also be requisite in the perspective here adopted to develop observation and 
warning systems through the comparative observation of institutions in different 
countries and regions, which systems are attuned to the longer-term observation 
of risk factors, and, conversely, to describe productive, social constellations. 
Also here it would depend on not overestimating the knowledge-generating and 




























































































on testing competing perspectives for their ability to be put into operation and 
on confronting them with one another, especially through the involvement of 
different sciences.
Social benefits, however, cannot be measured against the fictitious aim of 
the “equality” of citizens but only against the aim common to all citizens of the 
maintenance of the social relationship-network as a whole which, also in 
complex risk-situations created through accelerated self-transformation, must 
make possible longer-term commitment.
The quantitative growth of the social state observable in recent years has, 
however, produced ever more perverse side effects and has, thus, led to the 
increase in social conflicts within and between social classes and groups. During 
a phase of prosperity, this could possibly remain without grave consequences for 
the stability of society but in times of declining affluence, in which citizens are 
continually faced with the decline of (non-social) benefits by the administration 
and a simultaneous increase in the tax burden, such a development can become 
disastrous for the citizens' awareness. This is one of the risks of risk-regulating 
which is, more readily, suppressed by the widespread tendency to moralise. 
Without a sense of solidarity, the social state cannot function in the long run, 
and a solidarity which gets itself involved pragmatically in the co-operative 
modelling of alternative trajectories of social development and the experimenting 
with variable patterns of correlation and which is related to forms of the 
institutionalisation of flexibility to enable the adaptation to and the management 
of conditions of uncertainty. Only through institutionalisation can a public space 
be maintained which is appropriate to the virtuality of collective effects and, 
therewith, to the indirectness of social forms of regulating. The increasing 




























































































against indifference or evil is merely a symptom of the weakness of those 
institutions which exist for the observation and management of social risks. The 
lack of conventionalised risk-descriptions and risk-attributions which are attuned 
to one another finds its reverse in a paradoxical, unstructured making public 
previously private feelings (anxiety, worry, pity etc.) which covers up both the 
faculty of making distinctions and the decision-obligations of social institutions 
and, therefore, is thoroughly compatible with a harsh defence of social 
possessions. In a long term approach, the more vigorous support of voluntary 
social assistance should be considered because the increasing tendency to 
substitute paid outside assistance for assistance within the family already 
overburdens the social state; the increasing future demand for such services will, 
however, be increased even further owing to the increase in the percentage of 
old people in the European countries.
c) A “guaranteed minimum income” (“negative income tax”): citizens' 
solidarity or increasing re-distribution with sinking assets
The problematic extension of the welfare services of the social state 
through the disassociation from the other institutions of the liberal constitutional 
state and its social-state remodelling can also be seen in the example of what 
basic income ("Biirgergeld" "negative income tax"140), which should be the 
entitlement of every citizen and rises or falls, according to a tax law system 
which balances it against income from employment or assets. Considerable risks
140Cf. generally Offe, ibid.; the contributions in van Parijs (ed.), ibid.; Vobruba, ibid.; for 




























































































would face the few practical (also dubious) advantages of the standardisation of 
the administration. In reality, the administration would at first simply be moved 
from the social welfare offices to the tax offices - this is true at any rate of the 
variant of “negative income tax”, in which it is planned that a citizen below a 
minimum level of income is not only relieved of taxes but that a “negative” tax 
arises which has to be paid out. Because of the transfers to the financial 
administration and the simplification of the individual process accompanying the 
standardisation of cashing up, in longer term the risk is simultaneously produced 
of an increase even in the amount of administration necessary. The symbolic 
significance of the term (“negative income tax” or “citizens’ money”) should 
not be underestimated, because in this way the deceitful manipulation would 
become “positive” tax evasion, whilst the manipulated claim to payment from 
the social security offices must be perceived unambiguously as fraud. Such an 
incentive would also be increased quantitatively: today one can, at best, “save” 
all one's taxes, under the future system one could also save “negative taxes” if 
one manipulated one's income below the appropriate amount.
The amount of “citizens' money” would, precisely because of its 
disassociation from the other institutions of the economic and labour system, be 
exposed to the risk of politicisation, as is, with justice, feared, because it 
apparently concerns everyone even if it concerns most people merely as a 
theoretical factor in the calculation. The effect of simplification caused by 
"citizens' money" is, anyway, rather doubtful if the intention is pursued of 
satisfying therewith the various part services of social aid (housing benefit, the 
satisfaction of special needs etc.). It seems hardly possible to judge whether such 
a standardisation is actually realistic. For marginal groups, a voluntary 
homelessness or the occupancy of cheap accommodation could even be 




























































































bound nature of housing support would be given up. The advantages of 
administrative simplification would also have to be realised within the existing 
system of social aid. The same goes for the incentive to work which is to be 
connected with the new system because the taking into account of (part-) income 
in relation to "citizens' money" is to be made more flexible. According to the 
view here represented, the incentive to look for work could better be achieved 
through wage subsidies in the case of low wages.
It is primarily the symbolic effect and the increased danger of abuses 
which speak against "citizens' money". It could strengthen the obvious 
assumption that everyone has a basic “material” right to "citizens' money" and 
alleviate the necessity of confronting the citizens with the self-created 
obligations of the labour and economic system and of distinguishing collective 
as well as individual risk-attributions. The social state tends anyway to reduce 
the transparence of the attributions: “citizens' money” or “negative income 
taxes” are euphemisms which seem to confirm the idea, suggested itself by the 
existence of the social state, of the existence of a hom of plenty from which one 
may freely serve oneself - this does not, of course, exclude the fact that the 
social position of the majority of the recipients of social aid has to be improved 
as a matter of urgency!
It has already been stressed several times that collective systems of risk 
management which derive the justification for their existence from the 
accelerated self-modification of society have at least to be linked, for their part, 
to individual attributions and, therewith, limited. The only basis of this 
connexion between both institutions141 can be a solidarity which has earned 
this designation and which has to find its counterpart in collective, as well as




























































































individual, forms of risk-limitation. This order of solidarity cannot, under 
conditions of uncertainty, be built on the justice of individual cases or a direct 
"constitutionalisation" of the minimum income. However, it has to be linked to 
the changed forms of the knowledge of risks and of the social management of 
risks, through which the global constructions of reality, on the basis of differing 
collective and individual risk-attributions, can be modelled and, through 
observation and comparison, confirmed or refuted. Thus, it must, by an ideal 
example, be made apparent to all citizens that the society under conditions of 
accelerated self-transformation secures its readability to social risks through 
making possible an extended horizon of decision and longer-term, individual 
commitment and that, for this, financial contributions can be demanded from the 
better off citizens. This is, however, only possible if it is actually plausible that 
a society as a whole is more adaptable and humaner which secures against 
certain risks and, thus, also creates a public good. The securing of a subsistence 
minimum can, however, not be achieved in a way which, through the false 
appearance of universality (“citizens' money”), increases the heterogeneity of 
social institutions and, therewith, reduces the crucial potential of self-observation 
of a complex society which is far from being transparent to itself.
d) Résumé
In the interpretation here presented, the concept of proceduralisation 
aims to explain complex connexions in “viable” forms of model-formation and 
risk-management, to open up the requisite stochastic-probabilistic knowledge, 




























































































should help to broaden the range of possible actions and to raise sensitivity for 
cognitive rigidities and blocked situations. One could in a sense "use" the 
European institutions as a focus of observation of social policy on the national 
level conceived as generators of new knowledge to be introduced into the 
decentralized process of the social dialogue reinforcing its capability of self­
observation142. Taking into account the corporatist structure of social policy 
and the risk of establishing narrow views neglecting third-party interests, the 
role of European institutions could be that of an institutionalized evaluation 
agency confronting the national level with self-generated constraints following 
from social concerted action, especially the risk of creating externalities. The 
purpose of this practical evaluation should primarily consist in the design of 
models of "complex causality" accentuating long-term development and the 
experimentation with normative constructions of positive self-reinforcing 
networks of relationships between mainly organizational inter-actions and the 
attribution of consequences. One of the major interests should be the search for 
unintended consequences of inter-organizational negotiations and their 
réintroduction into social concertation processes. European institutions could 
make productive use of the actual differences between the national social policy 
systems in order to produce new knowledge from comparisons, the "pool of 
variety" of European social policies could thus be regarded as a kind of "social 
laboratory". On the European level a specific approach should be provisionally 
adopted as a framework of reference but, on the other hand, a competing one 
should be taken into account in order to make possible the self-reflection of the 
valuation process itself which cannot lay claim to produce neutral expertise. 
Model building under conditions of uncertainty is of course itself prone to
142Cf. generally K.-H. Ladeur, European Community Institutional Reforms. Extra-National 
Management as an Alternative Model to Federalism, Legal Issues of European Integration 




























































































functional equivalent to the cognitive achievements of the liberal forms of 
attribution and to increase the citizens' ability to confront self-created or 
normatively attributable obligations. This is based simultaneously on the 
assumption that the new social problems connected with the accelerated self­
transformation of society can be solved neither through re-distributions nor 
through state “measures” nor contracts between “social partners” nor through 
improving the social services. Additionally, too many crisis-phenomena arise 
which stand in no clear connexion to the distribution of income; this is true, for 
example, at least of plausible descriptions of an insidious decline in school and 
university education, which cannot be explained solely by poor future prospects 
but which is also a symptom of the weakening of institutionalised forms of the 
transmission of social stocks of knowledge and of the bonds of civilisation. In 
any case, it seems necessary to take seriously “Eurosclerosis” as the danger of 
a self-reinforcing process of de-civilisation which extends beyond the area of 
“social problems” and which demands new forms of the institutionalisation of 
the management of social risks.
8. Propositions for a New Cognitive Role of European Institutions in Social 
Policy-making
The European institutions should play an important cognitive role in the 
distributed reflexive model-building process of social policy outlined above. 
Considering the constructive character of knowledge stressed in this paper they 
should have a "catalytic" role of enabling actors to develop a provisional 




























































































uncertainty and error. This built-in alternative could be a self-reflective element 
of the reflexive potential to be institutionalized vis-à-vis the arenas of social 
policy on the level of the Member States.
To repeat it once more, the purpose of evalution should not just be one 
of scientific and neutral description but should be regarded as that of 
"moderation" in a cognitive dimension, it should be oriented at the set-up of 
operationalized "descriptors", criteria, methods of "monitoring" on the basis of 
a technique of scenario building. The potential applicability to and compatibility 
with strategies of negotiation and policy-making themselves should be a primary 
concern. European institutions should not endeavour to set up a regime of 
"expertocracy", the European level should rather be considered as a "consulting 
agency" which presupposes that the "observed systems" themselves are inter- 
organizational networks with their own rationality and constraints which cannot 
be "steered" from some central level of decision-making claiming to possess an 
over-arching rationality. The role of European institutions should rather be that 
of a mediator creating incentives to learn on the side of the actors, but it should 
not lay claim to possess "the" solution of a problem, its main target being then 
to "convince" the actors of its correctness.
The evaluation itself could be differentiated into two levels of decisions: 
firstly, the observation of specific measures and strategies of the social dialogue 
and especially the policy of social integration; secondly, the systemic approach 
of setting up a model being able to interpret and compare the industrial relations 
and public social policy of the Member States.
The possibility of the creation of a small independent agency should be 
considered: its main purpose could be to set up a framework of observation and 




























































































knowledge which itself should rather be developed on the basis of an invitation 
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